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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the upcoming process of developing internationally binding rules for 
ship scrapping. By use of the topical case of the Danish ferry ‘Kong Frederik IX’, potential 
obstacles in the international negotiation process are identified. The case is approached by use 
of the ideas and methodology of Emery Roe’s Narrative Policy Analysis, and we lean on both 
interviews with a number of central stakeholders and on a varied range of literature (work and 
conference papers, legal texts, guidelines, newspaper articles, and web sites). The case study 
is used to create an operational platform from which the political complexities of international 
regulation of ship scrapping can be discussed in a North–South perspective. 
 
The report documents how the regulative situation surrounding the ship scrapping scenario is 
addressed by or falls in between several sets of international regulation (both environmental 
agreements as the Basel Convention and trade regimes like the WTO), and how it therefore 
can be characterized as a “floating” regulative situation open for interpretation. It is also 
documented how numerous stakeholders are positioning themselves with very different 
political agendas and with sometimes conflicting economical interests, and how their 
interpretation of which rules apply is extremely different. This unclear and polarized 
regulative situation is in itself a potential obstacle for the development of internationally 
binding regulation of ship scrapping.  
 
More specifically, the report maps out how the numerous stakeholders draw on different and 
sometimes antagonistic policy narratives to justify their positions and actions. The narrative 
analysis recasts the stakeholder scenario in a way that helps explain the before mentioned 
polarization and the complexity that seems to characterize the situation. The case analysis 
functions as a heuristic device and also identifies a number of critical aspects that could be 
examined further: the basic disagreements over whether an end-of-life vessel should be 
considered a product or waste; the polarized positions on where to place the burden of more 
environmentally friendly and more safe ship scrapping procedures; and the future 
competences and legitimacy of the relevant international institutions, most prominently the 
International Maritime Organization and the Basel Convention. 
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Chapter 1: Field of Interest 
 
Motivation  
 
Globalisation can be defined as:  
 
“…the process of increasing interconnectedness between societies such that events in 
one part of the world more and more have effects on people and societies far away.” 
(Baylis 2001:7)  
 
Our report is concerned with two aspects of this process, viz. international 
environmental regulation and North-South issues1: 
 
International Environmental Regulation 
Environmental topics have appeared frequently on the international agenda since the 
1970es. Some of them are ‘global’ in the sense that they are related to the global 
commons (the pollution of the oceans, the depletion of the ozone layer, etc.); some are 
global in the sense that national governments all over the world experience similar 
environmental problems (smog, deforestation, etc.). No matter what, the causes of the 
problems are most likely related to broader political and socio-economic processes, 
which are themselves part of an increasingly global system (Baylis 2001:389). When 
environmental problems become global in the sense that they can be dealt with only 
through international cooperation, the challenge of solving them becomes global as 
well. In the world today no central supranational environmental authority exists, and 
global environmental issues are therefore in the hands of the sovereign states.  
 
By the year 2005, there were app. 200 multilateral (www.wto.org 2) and hundreds of 
bilateral environmental agreements. Some of these can be defined as so-called 
environmental regimes, while some can be said to lack the sufficient degree of 
                                                
1 We use the term North-South, “developing/developed country”, “first world/third world” somewhat indiscriminately 
to distinguish between what in the context of this report could be divided into OECD and non-OECD countries.   
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institutionalisation to classify as a regime2. If a regime is in existence, it means that 
several sovereign states have established or are trying to establish international 
governance of global or border-crossing issues. But what happens in cases, where a 
highly institutionalised regime is not in existence? Then, who are the prominent actors 
and how are global environmental problems solved? In this report we will be examining 
a concrete regulative situation which does not “naturally” fall under a single regime. 
Instead several regimes with different degrees of institutionalization are at play.  
 
In regards to global environmental issues Gunningham and Sinclair (Gunningham 2002: 
189-90) talk about a general reshaping of the regulatory landscape. According to them, 
the role of the regulatory state is changing and other stakeholders (for example NGOs 
and commercial third parties) are filling in the regulatory space it used to occupy 
(Ibid:189). We wish to look into this development: how does this supposedly increasing 
influence of non-state actors affect the regulatory landscape of the global environment?  
 
North-South Issues 
Today, the gap between rich and poor nations is enormous, and it has profound 
implications for the global environment (Vig 1999:5-6). Economic growth means 
increased environmental impacts, and the existing global economic structures mean that 
these impacts are unevenly distributed geographically (Martinez-Alier 2002:10). As a 
consequence, the needs and agendas of developed and developing countries in relation 
to environmental issues are fundamentally different. It is a well-known fact that 
developing countries are often skeptical about the new “green” agenda of the 
industrialized countries. In their critique of the North’s agenda they stress the 
“evolutionary” aspects (the fact that the developed part of the world has gone through 
centuries of industrial development without taking any environmental concerns) and the 
“protectionist” aspect (the fact that much environmental regulation can be interpreted as 
ways of controlling of the developing countries - and especially of upcoming tigers like 
China and India – and their access to Western markets).  
 
                                                
2 In this report Krasner’s widely used definition of regimes are adopted. In his terminology regimes are defined as 
“…sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ 
expectations converge in a given area of international relations.” (Krasner 1983: 2) 
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Theories of international regimes – both liberal and realist - point to the fact that 
negotiation processes of international regimes often depend on the interests of powerful 
states (Baylis 2001: 310-11). It is therefore natural to ask whether this regulation is 
based on Western-biased principles – for example the Polluter Pays Principle or the 
Precautionary Principle. And whether the less powerful countries of the South are able 
to influence the development of international environmental regulation significantly. 
Furthermore, if the role of non-state actors is increasing (as suggested by Gunningham 
and Sinclair above), then what are the consequences for developing countries’ 
representation and influence in international negotiations about environmental 
problems? These are some of the questions that guide our research in this report.  
 
International Regulation of Ship Scrapping3 
We wish to link these two issues by studying a case where they are naturally drawn in, 
viz. international regulation of ship scrapping. Ship scrapping is the process of end-of-
life-vessels being sold to recycling operations in developing countries. Today most of 
these vessels end up in the ship scrapping industry of India, Bangladesh, Pakistan or 
China, where the ships are dismantled and the valuable steel is recovered. For some of 
these countries recovering steel from end-of-life vessels is a growing industry and 
constitutes an important part of the total supply to the steel industry. Bangladesh, for 
example, used to import all of its scrap steel, while the ship scrapping industry now 
satisfies 80 % of its needs (Göhre 2000:1). Ship scrapping is therefore viewed upon as a 
cost-effective way of steel import as well as a valuable way to create jobs. It is 
estimated that around 200,000 Bangladeshis and around 500,000 Indians benefit 
directly or indirectly from this business (Ibid:2).  
 
The reverse of the medal is that most of these ships contain hazardous materials, such as 
asbestos and PCBs, and that these materials are not removed from the ships prior to 
selling them as scrap. The importing countries generally lack the environmental and 
occupational safety standards necessary to handle such hazardous components in a 
environmentally safe way. An end-of-life vessel typically contains significant amounts 
                                                
3 We use the term ship scrapping instead of ship breaking, ship dismantling or ship recycling, which are the terms used 
by the ILO, the Basel Convention and the IMO respectively. The term has been chosen because of its “neutral” status 
(ILO 2004c) 
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of hazardous material, and when handled and managed improperly this material can 
cause severe damage to both health and the environment. Depending on the exact type 
and amount of hazardous waste in question, impacts range from direct human poison 
exposure to longer-term environmental damage (leaching of chemicals into soil and 
groundwater, concentration in food-chains, etc.) (OECD 1998:5). A Greenpeace 
document estimates that in Alang, India, approximately 40,000 persons work daily 
under critical conditions, and it is estimated that one in four of these workers will 
contract cancer from the asbestos found on board imported waste ships (Puckett 2000). 
Other research based on specific case studies has linked community exposure to 
hazardous waste with increases in leukemia, kidney cancer and respiratory disorders 
(OECD 1998:5). According to the International Metalworker’s Federation, scrapping 
ships is one of the most work-intensive and dangerous job existing, and they estimate 
that the industry employs 160,000 workers in India alone (www.imfmetal.org).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a) Waste from a scrapped ship is being burned. b) Woman carrying remnants of asbestos-containing 
insulation material on the head. (Photos from www.greenpeaceweb.org) 
Picture 1: Working Conditions at Alang Scrapping Yard. 
 
a b 
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At the moment no specific and binding international regulation of ship scrapping exists 
– instead it is ambiguously addressed by different trade regulations, environmental 
conventions, and international agreements on workers’ rights. Compared to other areas 
of global environmental issues, regulation of trade with end-of-life-vessels is 
furthermore complicated by basic legal features related to maritime matters (such as 
international waters and flag-states). Currently, various international institutions are 
working on developing regulation that applies specifically to ship scrapping. A working 
group between The Basel Convention, The International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
and the International Labour Organization (ILO) has been established, and the issue has 
been on the agenda during meetings in the European Council and at IMO meetings in 
2005. As this report will show, the development of ship scrapping regulation is a 
complicated process involving a diverse range of stakeholders.  
 
Ship scrapping is an example of a so-called global environmental problem, in the sense 
that events (the need for final disposal of end-of-life vessels) in one part of the world 
(the industrialized part) have human health and environment related impacts on people 
and societies far away (the ship scrapping Asian countries). Some of the related 
environmental issues are “collective-action problems” that can only be regulated 
through international cooperation between a wide range of stakeholders. Even though 
no specific ship scrapping regulation exists, the trade with end-of-life-vessels, as well as 
the activities and impacts of the industry, could be said to fall under several different 
sets of international regulation – for example the Basel Ban4. But both state and non-
state actors are challenging the international rules. Typically, regulation is bypassed by 
classifying the worn out ships as ‘products’ and hereafter selling and transporting them 
legally as products instead of waste, avoiding the regulation concerning hazardous 
waste. This is possible, partly because the existing environmental regulation is vaguely 
formulated, which makes it possible for the different actors to interpret it very 
                                                
4 The so-called Basel Ban is a much-disputed ban on all trade with hazardous wastes from OECD to non-
OECD countries – including waste for recycling. This ban was negotiated in 1994 after a coalition of 
developing countries, environmental groups and European countries had fought for it. In 1995, the Basel 
Ban was turned into a proposed amendment which, when ratified by the requisite number of Parties, will 
enter into force and become binding. (www.ban.org 1) 
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differently, and partly because crucial aspects of the relevant regulation are non-
binding. There seems to be important differences in the way the various actors interpret 
the rules and no agreed-upon attitude to solving this problem. Furthermore, the issue 
highlights certain aspects of the position of state actors versus non-state actors and also 
differences between North and South positions on the matter. 
 
‘Kong Frederik IX’  
In order to be able to make a sound analysis of the above-mentioned areas and issues 
within the field of international environmental regulation - and ship scrapping 
specifically – a specific case has been chosen, viz. the case of the Danish ferry ‘Kong 
Frederik IX’. The ferry has recently been scrapped at Alang Beach in India, and has 
been the focus of much domestic and international attention in 2005.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Map of the State of Gujarat. 
 
Map of India highlighting the state 
of Gujarat where Alang beach is 
situated.  
(Map from www.encarta.com)
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Not only has this particular case had possible implications for the future Danish 
distribution of legal responsibility in regards to enforcement of international 
environmental agreements like the Basel Convention, it has also spurred a diplomatic 
controversy between Denmark and India. It has furthermore motivated the Danish 
government to put the issue on the agenda in recent EU and IMO negotiations. The case 
highlights a wide range of the issues outlined earlier in this chapter, and it points at a 
number of conditions and mechanisms that are characteristic for the regulation of ship 
scrapping in general. 
 
Research Question 
 
The development of internationally binding rules for ship scrapping can be 
characterized as an “open” situation5 in which a wide range of stakeholders position 
themselves with very different – and sometimes opposite – political and economical 
interests and agendas. The research question therefore goes:  
 
What does the ‘Kong Frederik IX’ case tell us about potential obstacles in the upcoming 
process of developing internationally binding regulation for ship scrapping? 
 
At the moment important rhetoric battles are being fought over basic features in this 
open situation. The rhetoric battlefield is being used by different stakeholders to 
promote their interests, and the outcome of the battles determines what the different 
stakeholders can actually say and do about ship scrapping. In other words: the 
discursive fights being fought at the moment might have significant consequences for 
the development of binding rules. In this report we will analyse this particular rhetoric 
scenario. The narrative approach (which will be presented in chapters 2 and 3) makes it 
possible to approach the rather complex and polarized scenario in a differentiated way 
that stays open to all kinds of different factors that might affect the development of ship 
scrapping rules.  
 
                                                
5 A floating regulative situation open for interpretation. 
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In perspective we will be using the outcome of the analysis to discuss different types of 
environmental regulation (certification, standardization, self regulation, etc.) in a North-
South perspective.  
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Report Design 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 1: Report Design 
 
Chapter 2: Theoretical Approach  
Emery Roe’s Narrative Policy Analysis approach will be introduced and 
arguments for choosing this particular approach will be presented 
  
Chapter 3: Methodology 
Our case study approach and our data collection methods will be 
discussed. We will furthermore “operationalise” Roe’s approach so that it is 
appropriate for the ‘Kong Frederik IX’ case. Finally, the chapter includes 
reflections on the media’s role in our analysis. 
 
Chapter 4: Case Presentation - ‘Kong Frederik IX’ 
Contains a chronological introduction to the ‘Kong Frederik’ IX case. 
 
Chapter 5: Ship Scrapping – a Description 
The history of ship scrapping as well as current issues will be presented 
and discussed. The chapter also contains a presentation of environmental 
and occupational safety aspects.  
 
Chapter 6: Ship Scrapping - the Regulative Landscape 
Different levels and areas of regulation affecting ship scrapping will be 
presented and discussed. 
 
Chapter 7: Stakeholder Identification and Characterisation 
An identification and a brief characterization of the different stakeholders 
will be presented. 
 
Chapter 8: The Dominant Narratives 
The dominant narratives in the ‘Kong Frederik IX’ case are identified and 
discussed.  
 
Chapter 9: Counternarratives 
Critique and narratives that go against the dominant stories are identified 
and discussed.  
 
Chapter 10: The Metanarrative 
Based on previous chapters a map of the narrative landscape surrounding 
the ‘Kong Frederik IX’ case will be drawn.  
 
Chapter 11: Conclusions 
We will present the identified obstacles for the development of 
internationally binding regulation of ship scrapping.  
 
Chapter 12: In Perspective 
The findings of this report will be used as a springboard for a discussion of 
the prospects for international environmental regulation of ship scrapping.  
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 Chapter 2: Theoretical Approach 
 
As mentioned above, we have chosen to approach our research question from a 
narrative perspective6. This chapter will outline why this perspective is suitable for our 
research agenda – how its focus, ideas, and concepts can be used to encompass certain 
elements of our research area, which will supplement non-narrative analyses of ship 
scrapping. It should be noted, though, that a critical reflection on our choice of approach 
- which also discusses the consequences of this particular choice compared to other 
theoretical schools - is included in chapter 11.  
 
First we will shortly discuss the concept of environmental regimes, which can be said to 
dominate the studies of international environmental regulation (Hansen 1997:264). 
After this we will discuss how the ship scrapping scenario falls under (or between) 
several international regimes, and how it constitutes a polarized and complex regulative 
field in the making. Finally, we will argue that Emery Roe’s Narrative Policy Analysis 
perspective is able to capture these features – and therefore has been chosen as the 
theoretical and methodological approach of this report.  
 
Environmental Regimes 
 
Not until the late 80s did environmental issues find their way into theories of 
International Relations (IR), but since then the dominant theoretical approaches have 
been centred around the notion of ‘environmental regimes’. There are various 
definitions of regimes, but one often referred to (e.g. (Baylis 2001), (Keohane 1982), 
(Keohane 1989), (Young 1993a), (Jakobsen 2000), (Hansen1997) is by Stephan 
Krasner:  
 
“Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and 
decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given 
area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. 
                                                
6 In short, the narrative perspective is based on the assumption that language matters: the stories that policy makers and 
their critics tell about decision making issues are a force in themselves and should therefore be analysed.  
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Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are 
specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are 
prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice”. (Krasner 1983:2) 
 
Krasner’s definition reveals that a regime is more than just a set of rules, and that it 
presupposes a quite high level of institutionalization (Baylis 2001:302). Furthermore, he 
makes an important distinction between principles and norms on the one hand, and rules 
and procedures on the other (Krasner 1983:3). The first are the basic defining 
characteristics of a regime, which also means that if they change the regime itself 
changes. The second are less defining in the sense that many different rules and 
procedures can exist that are consistent with the same principles and norms. This means 
that if rules and procedures change, we are talking about change within a regime. 
(Ibid:5) Krasner’s definition supposedly applies to all matters within international 
politics. Oran Young on the other hand works specifically with environmental regimes, 
and his work has come to set the framework for the study of international politics on the 
environment. Young’s understanding of regimes7 correlates well with Krasner’s above, 
and intends to encompass concrete agreements as well as “un-concrete” characteristics 
of global environmental politics8.  
 
The issue of ship scrapping potentially falls under – or between - several regimes with 
various degrees of institutionalization. The most significant feature may be that it can be 
said to fall under both trade regimes (like the WTO regime) and environmental regimes 
(like the Basel Convention), and that no international consensus has been reached at the 
moment about whether it is one or the other. The analysis of the ‘Kong Frederik IX’ 
case illustrates this still undetermined situation, as it highlights certain features and 
mechanisms in the process of deciding how this concrete case should be regulated. Thus 
it shows international politics in the making: How is it decided under which 
                                                
7 “Regimes are social institutions composed of agreed-upon principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures 
that govern the interactions of factors in specific issue areas” (Young 1993b:1)  
8 Critics argue, though, that Young (and others within this school) have a tendency towards focusing on successful 
regimes with a high level of institutionalization and organization, as for example the Montreal Protocol for the 
Protection of the Ozone Layer, thereby making international cooperation in the shape of regimes seem unproblematic 
and effective (Jakobsen 2000:45-47)  
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international regime a concrete case – or a concrete area like ship scrapping – should be 
regulated?  
 
Apart from the “in-between-regimes” status, ship scrapping is also characterised by a 
diverse and polarized stakeholder landscape, including an extremely powerful 
commercial actor, viz. the shipping industry. As mentioned, Gunningham (2002:189-
90) talk about a reshaping of the regulatory landscape in relation to environmental 
regulation, in the sense that the role of the regulatory state is changing and other 
stakeholders (NGOs and commercial third parties) are filling in the regulatory space it 
used to occupy. With this in mind, we wish to approach our research question with an 
openness towards the possibility that non-state actors take on an even more prominent 
and powerful role than state-actors.  
 
Narrative Policy Analysis 
 
Generally speaking, ship scrapping is a complex regulative field, which is being 
established as we speak. We wish to analyse international regulation of ship scrapping 
in a way that does not discount the political and social complexities that make up this 
field, but how can this be done? According to Emery Roe, many policy issues have 
become so uncertain, complex, and polarized that the only things left to examine are the 
different stories policymakers and their critics use to articulate and make sense of this 
uncertainty, complexity, and polarisation (Roe 1994:3). It is arguable that the 
international regulation of ship scrapping is one such issue. Not only do the involved 
stakeholders have very differing interests and perceptions of the situation (polarisation), 
we are also, to some extent, talking about regulation based on the precautionary 
principle (uncertainty), and with potential consequences for many different stakeholders 
all over the world (complexity). Following this line of thought, we have – for the case 
specific part of our analysis - adopted the ideas and methodology of Narrative Policy 
Analysis as presented by Roe9 (Roe 1994).  
 
                                                
9 The ideas and methodology of Roe’s approach to narrative policy analysis will be presented in chapter 3. 
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Box 2: Concept Clarification 
 
 
According to Roe, the objective of doing a narrative policy analysis is two-fold: 
 
First, to underscore the important and necessary role that policy narratives have in 
public policy everywhere and, second, to establish the usefulness of narrative analytical 
approaches that allow one to reformulate increasingly intractable policy problems in 
ways that then make them more amenable to the conventional policy analytical 
approaches of micro-economics, statistics, organizational theory, law, and public 
management practice.  
(Roe 1994:1) 
 
As the analysis will show, conducting a narrative analysis of the ‘Kong Frederik IX’ 
most definitely underscores the important role of policy narratives surrounding the issue 
of ship scrapping, and attempts in this way to explain things from an angle that 
supplements non-narrative models of explanation. Roe defines policy narratives as the 
stories (with beginnings, middles, and ends) and arguments (with premises and 
conclusions) on which policy is based (Roe 1994:155). In other words, policy narratives 
are not simply a politician’s or government bureaucrat’s argumentation for a specific 
policy decision. Instead they are the political arenas on which politics are negotiated by 
a wide range of stakeholders. In this report we will be examining the political arenas on 
which the development of internationally binding rules for ship scrapping is taking 
Complexity: an issue’s intricacy 
and/or its interdependence with 
other policy issues 
 
Polarization: the concentration 
of groups around extremes in an 
issue 
 
Uncertainty: lack of knowledge 
about what matters 
 
(Roe 1994:2)
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place. Conducting an analysis of the stakeholders’ narratives will show how important 
rhetoric battles are fought and how the outcome of these battles influences the process.  
 
In line with Roe above, the purpose of our analysis is furthermore to create a new 
perspective on the many complex aspects of ship scrapping – to reformulate the 
scenario in a way that makes it more amenable to other types of analysis, as he puts it 
above. The narrative policy analysis should be seen as a heuristic device that creates 
new “angles of attack” for other types of analyses. The analysis should therefore be 
followed by other analyses (juridical, technical, economic, etc.), which are difficult to 
conduct at the moment due to the many uncertainties surrounding the issue and the 
complexity of it. In chapters 10 and 11 we will use the outcome of the case specific 
analysis to outline the critical aspects of ship scrapping that would be relevant to 
scrutinize further.  
 
It is important to stress that there is nothing “superior” about the narrative policy 
analysis approach compared to more traditional approaches. We simply believe that in a 
highly complex setting, narrative policy analysis is a useful tool. Furthermore, Roe’s 
approach seems to have a sufficient degree of “openness” to be able to encompass 
certain features of the ship scrapping scenario – for example the influence of national 
political processes on international politics, the different agendas of North and South 
actors, the “in-between-regimes” regulative situation, etc. As mentioned at the 
beginning of this chapter, chapter 11 includes a discussion of whether the outcome of 
analysis could have been reached by use of another theoretical perspective.  
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
 
Case Study Approach 
 
Leaning on both Emery Roe’s (Roe 1994:2) and Bent Flyvbjerg’s (Flyvbjerg 1991:137-
157) understanding of case study research, we will argue that in dealing with an area as 
complex as international regulation of ship scrapping, it is necessary to conduct 
concrete case studies and produce context-dependent knowledge. It is our intention to 
use the case of ‘Kong Frederik IX’ to discuss the prospects for international regulation 
of ship scrapping, so a few remarks on our choice of case seem appropriate:  
 
The ‘Kong Frederik IX’ case could be labelled a paradigmatic case, using Flyvbjerg’s 
terminology (Flyvbjerg 1991:151-53). According to Flyvbjerg, a paradigmatic case 
turns out to set a fashion within its field and achieves the status of metaphor or 
prototype for future research. Whether this report will achieve this is yet unclear (and 
here a pinch of humility might be appropriate!). But the way in which the ‘Kong 
Frederik IX’ case can be said to meet Flyvbjerg’s criteria is that we are dealing with a 
new regulative field, which is being established as we speak, i.e. not much research has 
been conducted yet. Also, the case has a “broad nature” and illustrates a wide range of 
aspects that we presume to be generally valid for the ship scrapping scenario (and other 
scenarios that have “in-between-regimes” status for that matter). While the case might 
not be empirically representative for ship scrapping as a whole, it could be said to be 
analytically  representative and thereby form the basis for future studies of this field in 
the making (which also goes well in line with our use of Roe’s methodology as a 
heuristic device).  
 
Initially, we were looking for a case that could illustrate the clash between international 
trade regimes and international environmental regimes, and especially the North-South 
aspects of this conflict. Since the case has unfolded simultaneously with the making of 
this report, there was no initial guarantee that it would be suitable for this purpose, so let 
us try (like Flyvbjerg points out (1991:152-53)) in retrospective to justify our intuitive 
choice: 
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Based on our knowledge about the specific case (particularly the diverse stakeholder 
landscape, the clash between trade and environmental regulation, and the differences 
between North and South agendas), about the number of end-of-life vessels that are 
heading for scrapping, about the demand for steel in a number of Asian countries, about 
“classical” Basel and IMO disputes, and about the shipping industry in general, we now 
look at the ‘Kong Frederik IX’ case as a “typical” ship scrapping case. In a Danish 
context it is not the first ferry to end up in Alang, and in an international context the 
ferry is merely one out of many OECD end-of-life vessels that end up in the Asian ship 
scrapping industry. The way it ended up in Alang - that is via a number of more or less 
easily identifiable middlemen and brokers - is also common. What makes the case 
“uncommon” is the immense focus of attention that it has had, and the aftermath that it 
has spurred both in Denmark, India, and internationally. Typical or not, the case can be 
used to highlight a number of political mechanisms that with advantage could be 
examined further. Without claiming that the outcome of the case-specific analysis can 
be generalized onto the general ship scrapping scenario – at least not without careful 
consideration and further analyses - the main purpose with the ‘Kong Frederik IX’ case 
is to create an operational platform from which the political complexities of 
international regulation of ship scrapping can be discussed.  
 
The Narrative Policy Analysis Procedure 
 
The basic assumption on which the narrative policy analysis approach rests is that 
stories used by the different stakeholders to describe and analyze policy issues are a 
force in themselves, and must be considered explicitly when assessing policy options 
(Roe 1994:2). It is a cross-disciplinary approach that builds on insights and 
methodologies of literature studies, and it seeks to apply contemporary literary theory to 
extremely difficult public policy areas (domestic or overseas) that span the social, 
economic, political, scientific, and environmental spectra. According to Roe, the 
comparative advantage of narrative policy analysis lies in high polarized policy 
controversies, where the values and interests of opposing camps are so fundamentally 
divided that no middle ground for compromise exists between them. (Ibid:1-2). For 
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example the ship scrapping scenario, where at first glance it seems impossible to find 
any middle ground between the “profit-oriented” shipping industry and the 
environmentally concerned Basel delegates, or between the “green agenda” of Denmark 
and the growth-oriented national five-year country plan of India.  
 
The Four Steps  
A narrative policy analysis can roughly be said to proceed by four steps. Roe describes 
the first step as follows: 
 
“The analyst starts with the conventional definition of stories and identifies those policy 
narratives in the issue of high uncertainty that conform to this definition: If they are 
stories, they have beginnings, middles, and ends, as in scenarios; if arguments, they 
have premises and conclusions. […] the policy narratives of interest here are those 
scenarios or arguments that dominate the issue in question, namely, those used to 
underwrite and stabilize the assumptions for policymaking […]” 
(Roe 1994:155) 
 
Hereafter (step two) the non-stories (those narratives that do not conform to the above 
definition of ‘story’) and counterstories (those narratives that run counter to the 
controversy’s dominant policy narratives) are identified. When this is done, one should 
compare the two sets of narratives (step three): the stories and the non-
stories/counterstories in order to generate a meta-narrative “told” by the comparison. 
The meta-narrative is the narrative told by the comparison of narratives, non-stories, and 
counterstories. The fourth - and final – step is to asses whether the meta-narrative 
recasts the problem in such a way as to make it more amenable to conventional policy-
analytical tools. (Roe:55-56)  
 
Other Theories 
The ideal narrative policy analysis procedure is an extremely time-demanding process 
in which all relevant stakeholders should be interviewed (preferably more than once), 
interview transcripts should be disaggregated into problem statements, and a network 
analysis of all these statements should be made. Due to the limited time frame of this 
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report, it has not been possible to follow Roe’s procedure in detail10. Instead we draw on 
other theorists’ generalized accounts of discourses of the global environment, for 
example John S. Dryzek (1997), Joseph Murphy (2000), and Mathew Cole (2000). 
Their characterizations of especially three environmental discourses – viz. Sustainable 
Development, Ecological Modernization, and the Promethean Discourse– have been 
used in our research to help explain the narrative landscape that surrounds the ‘Kong 
Frederik IX’ case. For “reader-friendly” purposes these three discourses are presented in 
the beginning of chapter 8’s part 1, 2, and 3 respectively, which might give the 
impression that we have been consciously searching for them in the narrative landscape. 
In fact, it is the other way around: the empirical data “contained” these features, and the 
theorists’ generalized accounts could help explaining what we had identified.     
 
Stakeholders 
As mentioned, the narrative policy analysis approach is intended for areas that are 
characterised by complexity, uncertainty, and polarisation, and therefore also by a broad 
range of divergent actors. The starting point is the stories policymakers and their critics 
use to articulate and make sense of a complex policy scenario (Roe 1994:3). This is a 
rather inclusive understanding of who is a stakeholder, because in a political process 
like the development of binding ship scrapping rules, politicians are not the only 
policymakers. A stakeholder like the shipping industry, for example, is granted crucial 
decision-making power in a forum like the IMO. And the range and number of critics is 
plentiful! Roe’s inclusive interpretation of who is a stakeholder, also follows from his 
understanding of the field of analysis, viz. political decision making procedures:  
 
“Decision making is a hodgepodge of muddling through, groping along, 
opportunistically, incrementally, hopefully by rules of thumb and bounded rationality, 
in organized anarchies where nothing is ever thrown away but is rarely available or 
agreed upon when you need it the most” (Roe 1994:xi). 
 
In the case of ‘Kong Frederik IX’, we have identified a range of involved and affected 
stakeholders. The criteria for selection are 1) a number of “classical” stakeholder 
                                                
10 To what extent this has affected the outcome of our analysis will be discussed in chapter 11. 
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positions, 2) their appearance in the media coverage of the story, and 3) the fact that 
stakeholders belonging to 1) or 2) have labelled them a stakeholder. The starting point 
has been the discursive arena surrounding the case.  
 
The Procedure Applied to ‘Kong Frederik IX’ 
In relation to the case specific analysis, the first step is to identify the stories that 
dominate the ‘Kong Frederik IX’ case.  In chapter 8 the stories and arguments used by 
the stakeholders to stabilize and legitimize their position and actions are analyzed and 
discussed.  
 
Step two is to identify counternarratives, i.e. the narratives that go against the 
dominating ones outlined in chapter 8. Non-stories, i.e. narratives that do not constitute 
a “complete” story (with a beginning, middle, and end) about the case, are sought for. 
This is done in chapter 9. 
 
In chapter 10 we proceed with step three. We compare the narratives of chapters 8 and 9 and 
thereby recast the polarized stakeholder scenario, i.e. we present a metanarrative. The 
metanarrative points out a number of aspects that might help the involved stakeholders 
understand better the complex and uncertain situation they are part of. The last part of the 
chapter is a discussion of the usefulness of the metanarrative (step 4) and points at issues for 
further research. 
 
 
Empirical Data  
 
The empirical data used in analyzing the case in question is a combination of news 
articles, conference papers, documents, letters, and interviews with some of the 
prominent stakeholders on the Danish side. Roe’s procedure is based on primary data in 
the form of qualitative stakeholder interviews, and we would of course have preferred to 
interview all major actors. Due to the limited time frame of our research as well as to 
the lack of financial resources to conduct fieldwork in India this has not been possible. 
We have not conducted interviews with any of the Indian stakeholders, but on the 
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Danish side we have interviewed the Danish Environmental Protection Agency, 
Greenpeace Nordic, Steen Gade (Socialist People’s Party) as a representative of the 
political opposition, and Mogens Nørgaard Olesen – the Danish citizen who in many 
ways can be said to have kick started the entire case. In accordance with the narrative 
policy analysis approach, the interviews have been open-ended, geared to letting the 
interviewee tell her or his story, and the purpose has been to find out how these 
stakeholders define the problem in question, and how they identify and assess 
alternatives and choose between them. (Roe 1994:158).  
 
The extensive media coverage of the case has helped us compensate for the lack of 
interviews. The majority of the central actors have continuously expressed their opinion 
about the case via the media, and we have been able to base the analysis on this data as 
well. The second hand data from newspapers, television, and websites have been 
verified by comparing them with official documents and press releases as well as the 
stakeholder interviews. It goes without saying that this verification process has been 
difficult to conduct in the Indian context due to the lack of interviews with Indian 
stakeholders, and it is possible to raise the objection that this has affected the outcome 
of our analysis. It is notable though, that the Indian media is known for its high 
standards: “…media has assumed the role of a fourth pillar of democracy in all respects 
thus representing the voice of people, making exposures on corruption through 
investigative journalism, thus laying bare the claims of politicians and bureaucracy, 
and pronouncing bold statements in editorials and articles that reflect the opinions of 
intellectuals, activists, and specialist on the current issues” (Jain 2004:88). But, the 
lack of interviews demands reflections on the media’s role in our research, as will be 
done in the following section.  
 
The Media  
 
Since we - in line with Roe - understand stakeholders as policymakers and their critics, 
the media classifies as a stakeholder (a critic) as well. The media’s role as a stakeholder 
is quite different from the other stakeholders in the analysis, though, since their main 
objective is to “sell the story” as a way of keeping the viewers’ attention or selling 
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newspapers. Generally speaking, when the media choose to cover a story or choose not 
to cover it, they consider the supposed interests of its audience, which they need to 
preserve (Smith 2000:132). In the ‘Kong Frederik IX’ case these interests differ from 
Denmark to India - since we speak of different audiences with different interests in a 
different context - but on both sides the media have played a vital role in raising the 
ferry’s status to a prominent and “symbolic” case by giving it extensive coverage when 
it started and by keeping it alive through the entire process.  
 
Through most of 2005 the media’s “process oriented” role forced the involved 
stakeholders to reconsider and renew their accounts. One example of how the 
stakeholders were forced to keep commenting and acting on the case is how the Danish 
Minister for the Environment completely changed her story. If the case had not obtained 
the degree of media attention it did, it would not have been necessary for the minister to 
change her story. But since the case was continuously followed up by the media - and 
by the political opposition and NGOs through the media - she was under pressure to 
change her story to a more “active” and result-oriented one. An example from the 
Indian side is how critical media reports forced the Ministry for Environment and 
Forests, which had been remarkably quiet up until this point, to publicize a press release 
in which it dismissed accusations of law violation11.  
 
As mentioned above, we have verified media accounts whenever it has been possible, 
knowing that the media’s handling of the case has significantly influenced the outcome 
of it: which stakeholders have been given time and space in the media coverage; how 
are they portrayed; etc. We have attempted to take this into consideration throughout the 
analysis.  
 
                                                
11 These examples will be discussed further in chapter 8 
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Chapter 4: Case Presentation – ‘Kong Frederik IX’ 
 
In order to find an operational method to examine some of the aspects of ship scrapping 
discussed in chapter 1, a specific case has been chosen: the ferry ‘Kong Frederik IX’. 
Below, the course of events in the case is described and a timeline is included to give an 
overview of the case. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Kong Frederik IX 
 
 
The ferry ‘Kong Frederik IX’ was built in 1954 in Elsinore. For many years it was used 
to transport passengers and vehicles between Funen and Sealand, but when a bridge 
between the two islands came into use in 1997, the ferry was taken out of service. 
Initially the ship was turned into a museum financed by different funds, but due to local 
level bureaucracy and economic problems the project went bankrupt in 2002 (Mogens 
Nørgaard Olesen, interview d. 30/9 2005). Hereafter a chain of sellers and buyers can be 
identified: 
 
First a Chinese company bought the ferry, but shortly after the ship was sold again and 
bought by the Danish company KFIX A/S, who apparently had plans to turn the ship 
into a conference and event centre (www.kfix.dk). These plans were cancelled at some 
point in 2004/5 and the ship was sold on to Jupiter Ship Management – a company that 
within the last two years had sent 10 ships to be scrapped in India and Bangladesh 
(Politiken 26/2 2005). A private Danish citizen, Mr. Mogens Nørgaard Olesen, who had 
 Facts about Kong Frederik IX 
 
 
Building Year   1954 
Building Yard   Helsingør
Length    114,25 m 
Bredth    17,7 m 
Draft    4,7 m 
Machinery                     2*B&W 
1050VR90
Speed    16 kn. 
Number of passengers 1.500 
(photo from www.ferryphotos.co.uk)
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been involved in turning the ferry into a museum and who still followed the case 
closely, obtained information about the deal. This information strongly implied that the 
ship was being sold with the intention of being scrapped in India, which made Mogens 
Nørgaaard Olesen contact politicians, the media, and Greenpeace in order to draw 
attention to this fact and thereby prevent the ferry from being sold.   
 
In February 2005 a Greenpeace action campaign in the harbour of Halsskov drew the 
Danish media’s attention to the ferry, which at that time was waiting for permission to 
leave Danish waters. According to Greenpeace and several experts the ship was 
intended for scrapping in Asia, and the NGO was campaigning to make the local 
authorities (the municipality of Korsør) demand guarantees from both seller and buyer 
that this was not the case and to encourage the municipality to prevent the ferry from 
leaving Denmark. Greenpeace and others claimed that if the ferry was sold to be 
scrapped it would be in conflict with existing national and international environmental 
legislation about trade in hazardous waste, because the ferry contained hazardous 
components such as asbestos. In Denmark administration and management of waste 
related matters are allocated to the local municipalities (www.mst.dk), which left the 
municipality of Korsør in a central position: it was the stakeholder with authority to 
prevent the ship from leaving Denmark.  
 
The Danish newspapers and broadcasting media launched information and statements 
from international (sometimes unspecified) experts, from maritime newsletters on the 
internet12, from Greenpeace Denmark, from the before-mentioned Mogens Nørgaard 
Olesen, etc., indicating that the ship was intended for scrapping, not further operation as 
the seller and the buyer claimed. In mid February - after a meeting with the Danish 
Environmental Protection Agency (DEPA) - the municipality of Korsør admitted that 
circumstantial evidence pointed in the direction of scrapping and therefore required the 
former owners, Danish KFIX A/S, to document that the ship really was intended for 
further use (Politiken 16/2 2005). KFIX subsequently provided the authorities with the 
requested documents stating that the ship was to continue operating, transporting 
passengers in the Persian Gulf (Politiken 23/2 2005). Parallel with these negotiations the 
                                                
12 For example www.maritimematters.com claiming to have obtained information about the ship being expected at 
Alang beach in India (Politiken 15/2 2005) 
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Indian crew was onboard the ferry waiting for departure, and the Danish Maritime 
Authority was holding back the ship for further investigations on seaworthiness. 
 
In mid March, after having examined the documentation provided by KFIX, the 
municipality of Korsør allowed for the ferry – now named “Frederik” - to depart. 
According to the local municipality, there was no legal basis to keep the ship from 
sailing (Municipality of Korsør 8/3 2005). Also the Danish Maritime Authorities rested 
their case, and stated that since the ship was registered in Sct. Vincent it was in reality 
the Sct. Vincent maritime authorities that were responsible (Politiken 17/3 2005). ‘Kong 
Frederik IX’ left Danish waters. 
 
On its journey through the Mediterranean, the ferry passed by Greece where – according 
to the Danish authorities’ knowledge – it was supposed to go through a thorough 
renovation. It now seemed plausible that the ship was heading for India as the critics 
had predicted and the Danish Minister for the Environment, Ms. Hedegaard, sent a letter 
to the Indian Minister for the Environment, Mr. A. Raja, requesting the Indian 
authorities not to allow the approaching ship to enter Indian waters and to prevent it 
from beaching (Politiken 25/4 2005a). The Indian Minister replied that India did not 
regard the ferry as hazardous waste and assured that India had the adequate facilities 
and the appropriate national legislation to dismantle the ship in an environmentally 
sound and safe way (Raja 2005). As a response the Danish minister sent a second letter 
in which she repeated her request to return the ship (Hedegaard 2005), but the Indian 
authorities still refused to return the ferry to Denmark.  
 
On April 24th the Danish media announced that ‘‘Kong Frederik IX’ ‘– now ‘Riky’ – 
had arrived at Alang beach in India (Politiken 24/4 2005). Subsequently both 
Greenpeace and Ms. Hedegaard stated that they would file a police report on the matter 
the following day, in order to have the role of the seller, the buyer and the mediator 
investigated as to how the ferry could end up in Alang despite the documentation and 
guaranties given (Ibid). A police report was filed (DEPA 2005) but has not been 
concluded upon at the time of writing. The next couple of weeks the Indian authorities 
were inspecting the ship and deciding on whether scrapping could be approved or not, 
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while in Denmark the Danish opposition was giving Ms. Hedegaard a hard time, 
because she had declared that the Danish authorities could and would not do more than 
report the matter to the police (Politiken 25/4 2005b). After several meetings between 
the Danish ambassador in India and the Indian environmental authorities, it became 
clear that Denmark’s request for India to return the ferry would not be met (Politiken 
30/4 2005). When an official letter stating this reached the Danish authorities, the 
Danish Foreign Minister, Mr. Per Stig Møller, entered the case and wrote a letter to the 
Indian Foreign Minister requesting him to take action, but as with Ms. Hedegaard’s 
letters, the requests were not accommodated. Greenpeace, BAN and the political 
opposition encouraged the Danish authorities to take further action through other 
international channels like the regulatory framework of the Basel Convention 
concerning export and import of hazardous waste, but the authorities decided not to.  
 
In May Greenpeace India notified the Indian Supreme Court’s Monitoring Committee 
(SCMC) about the matter, and unprecedentedly it was recommended by the committee 
that ‘Riky’ should be sent back to Denmark (SCMC 2005). In July, however, the Indian 
media reported that the SCMC had reversed its earlier position on ‘Riky’ and now was 
positive towards the ship being beached and scrapped at Alang (Express News Service 
27/5 2005). It is not clear what exactly caused this withdrawal of the first 
recommendations – some have suggested political pressure from the national level, 
others disputes between the Supreme Court and the Ministry for Environment and 
Forests, others again corruption and vested interests.  
 
The scrapping of ‘Riky’ took place in Alang until September 2005, when Ms. 
Madhumita Dutta from the Indian Corporate Accountability Desk13 (Dutta 2005 a) filed 
an official petition to the Supreme Court of India, in which she accuses the Government 
of India of violation of the Basel Convention as well as of violation of two domestic 
laws regarding hazardous waste (Ibid). According to official statements from the Indian 
Authorities, the dismantling activities have been paused while Ms. Dutta’s petition is 
being investigated. Other sources claim that this is not the case, and that the ferry at that 
time had already been 40 % dismantled. The before mentioned committee under the 
                                                
13 Corporate Accountability Desk is an Indian NGOs who cooperates with a range of other NGO in a self-proclaimed 
‘Green Coalition’ concerned with environmental and occupational health and safety issues. 
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Supreme Court (SCMC) denies that Ms. Dutta has a case, but an official conclusion is 
still being awaited, expected to come in January 2006. 
 
In November 2005 the scrapping of ‘Kong Frederik IX’ alias ‘Riky’ was reportedly 
completed. 
 
 
Time Line – Kong Frederik IX 
 
 
1954          Kong Frederik IX was built in Ellsinore 
19/8 1954         Launched 
 
1954-96         Operating on various domestic routes 
 
11/3 1997         Handed over to ‘Danmarks Færgemuseum’ (Danish ferry museum) 
 
2001          Danmarks Færgemuseum goes bankrupt 
 
16/11 2002         Bought by Hou-Chi Ho, Gentofte, Denmark 
6/3 2003         Bought by Rib Investment, Nicosia, Cypres 
April 2003         Bought by a group of Danish investors KFIX A/S 
2005          Bought by Jupiter Ship Management 
 
15/2 2005  Greenpeace Action Campaign in the harbour of Halskov, Denmark with 
the purpose of drawing attention to the indications that the ship is being 
sold to be scrapped in India 
 
8/3 2005  The Municipality of Korsør concludes that the ferry cannot be classified 
as waste 
 
9/3 2005  Greenpeace Denmark requests the Danish police to detain ‘Kong 
Frederik IX’ to prevent it from leaving Danish waters 
16/3 2005          Leaves Denmark, heading for international waters 
March/April The ship is being followed closely on its journey and it soon becomes 
clear that the ship is heading directly for Alang, India 
 
15/4 2005  The Danish Minister of the Environment writes her Indian colleague to 
prepare him that the ship will arrive in India and requesting him to return 
the ship to Denmark to be stripped for hazardous waste 
 
April 2005          Renamed ‘Frederik’ and later ‘Riky’ 
 
22/4 2005          Arrives at Alang, India 
22/4 2005          Sold to Shreeji Shipping Agency, Alang, India 
25/4 2005  The Danish Environmental Protection Agency request the national 
commission of the Danish police to investigate the case of ‘Kong 
Frederik IX’ on the grounds that the ship ended up in Alang despite 
assurances and guaranties form the seller and buyer 
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28/4 2005 The Indian Minister for the Environment and Forests writes his Danish 
colleague, informing her that the Indian government, after inspections 
on the ship, had determined that it could not be classified as hazardous 
waste and therefore was not to be returned 
 
4/5 2005  The Danish Minister of the Environment writes her Indian colleague 
again, referring again to the Basel Convention and requesting him to 
reconsider his decision 
 
24/5 2005  The Director of the Indian Supreme Court Monitoring Committee 
(SCMC) strongly recommends by reference to both national law and the 
Basel Convention that the ferry should be send back to Denmark 
 
11/7 2005          The Indian authorities allows for the scrapping to begin  
 
September 2005 Madhumitta Dutta, an Indian NGO activist, files a written petition to the 
Indian Supreme Court claiming that the government’s Indian authorities’ 
position in the ‘Kong Frederik IX’ case is in violation with both domestic 
law and the Basel Convention. The ongoing scrapping of ‘Riky’ is 
apparently temporarily stopped 
 
September 2005 SCMC dismisses Dutta’s case and supports the position of the ministry 
Environment and Forests (MoEF). An official closure on Dutta’s case is 
still to come. 
 
23/9 2005 Gujarat Maritime Board gives clearance for dismantling the ship 
 
November 2005 Scrapping of ‘Kong Frederik IX’/’Riky’ completed 
 
December 2005 At least one other Danish ferry ex-‘Dronning Margrethe II’, now re-
named ‘Beauport II’ is documented to be beached at Alang awaiting 
scrapping. It is unknown for how long it has been beached at Alang 
 
January 2006 A conclusion from the Supreme Court of India on Dutta’s case is 
expected to come. It was originally expected in December 2005 but was 
postponed.  
 
 
Figure 3: Timeline – ‘Kong Frederik IX’ 
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Chapter 5: Ship Scrapping – a Description 
 
The purpose of this chapter – and of chapter 6 as well - is to establish what kind of 
situation we are dealing with. It will become clear throughout these chapters that many 
stakeholders are at play and that the regulative situation that surrounds ship scrapping 
can be characterized as complex and open for different interpretations. 
 
In chapter 5 we offer an introductive description of ship scrapping, including a 
historical perspective and a short description of the current situation. Furthermore the 
various implications on human health and the environment are briefly presented to 
complement the information already introduced in chapter one. In the chapter 
discussion, these issues are discussed to give an idea of the many differing opinions on 
the matter and to draw attention to the uncertain and frequently contested nature of the 
scientific knowledge that surrounds the issue. 
 
In chapter 6 we turn to a description and discussion of the regulative framework that 
surrounds ship scrapping. This chapter is also closed by a chapter discussion.  
 
Together, these two chapters provide background information and introduce basic 
discussions relevant for the analysis and further discussion and analysis of the case 
‘Kong Frederik IX’.  
 
History and Current Situation 
 
Ship scrapping is the process of dismantling an obsolete vessel’s structure for scrapping 
or disposal (www.osha.gov). It includes a wide range of activities, from removing all 
gear and equipment to cutting down and recycling the vessel’s infrastructure. This is a 
challenging process because of the structural complexity of the vessel and the many 
environmental, safety and health issues involved. (ILO 2004a:3) An obsolete vessel 
mainly consists of steel that can be reused, but it also typically contains a number of 
problematic hazardous components (see box 3).  
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In the 1970s, the dismantling of end-of-life vessels primarily took place in Europe. In 
highly mechanised industrial operations the ships were dismantled at European docks. 
In the late 1980s a tightening of environmental regulations in industrialized countries 
was intensified, which consequently led to increased costs in complying with 
environmental, health and safety standards.  Most of the ship scrapping industry moved 
to a number of Asian countries, most significantly to India, Bangladesh, China and 
Pakistan, on account of low wages and lower level of compliance with international 
standards on safety, health and the environment (ILO 2004a:4). Today only a few 
OECD countries have operating ship scrapping facilities. A recent feasibility study 
commissioned by the EEC concluded that ship scrapping is unlikely to take place in 
Europe because of its hazardous nature, it’s relatively high labour cost, and the lack of 
demand for scrap steel (Ibid).  
 
It is worth noting, though, that funding for a so-called ‘zero pollution’ ship scrapping 
yard in the Netherlands has been obtained in 2005. The purpose of this yard is to 
establish demolition possibilities for dry-cargo ships, tankers and platforms using 
ecologically sound working methods and favourable employment conditions. The idea 
of the company behind the new environmentally sound scrapping yard is to replicate the 
project and to have 30 or 40 yards worldwide in the future. The timeframe for the 
project is yet unknown. (www.ecodock.info) 
 
The price for a vessel intended for scrapping offered by Asian buyers today is up to 
twice as high as the OECD prices14, which make the Asian market financially attractive 
for the ship owners. It can therefore be discussed whether the planned yard in the 
Netherlands will be able to attract customers as long as it is possible for the industry to 
export end-of-life vessels to non-OECD countries. According to a report on ship 
scrapping in OECD ordered by the Danish Environmental Protection Agency (Stuer-
Lauridsen 2003), the price level difference is primarily caused by a difference in the 
demand for recovered steel and a difference in the cost of labour. Of minor importance 
is the fact that the management and disposal of hazardous materials plays a more 
                                                
14 ILO research estimates the price in 2000 to be between US$120 and US$185 per ton (Göhre 2000:1), and according 
to Greenpeace the 2004/5 prices are much higher – up to 700 US$ per ltd (ECORYS 2005:2). 
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significant role (app. 5% of the cost) in OECD countries compared to the Asian 
countries.  
 
As a result of the above (and despite the planned yard in the Netherlands), the ship 
demolition industry for large vessels in OECD countries is on the decline. This decline 
conflicts with an increasing number of end-of-life vessels that demand scrapping in the 
near future, due to an increase of the world fleet during the last decades and an 
international decision to phase-out all single-hull tankers before 2016 
(www.greenpeaceweb.org 1) (COWI feature 2003:8). The future scenario is therefore 
that the OECD demand for scrap facilities is growing while the domestic demolition 
industry generally is disappearing, meaning that the increasing number of end-of-life 
vessels from OECD countries are likely to end up in the ship scrapping industry in Asia. 
 
Since most OECD countries, as well as many Asian countries, have ratified the Basel 
Convention and thereby agreed to work for an environmentally sound management of 
hazardous waste, it becomes urgent for these countries to take a position on the situation 
and the conditions for ship scrapping in Asia as these activities involve handling and 
trading of hazardous materials. But as this report will show there are many interests at 
stake and the many actors involved try to draw the development of regulating this 
industry in different directions.  
 
Roughly, the ship scrapping industry can be perceived and presented as two very 
different scenarios: for some Asian countries it constitutes an important part of the total 
supply to the steel industry. Scrapping end-of-life vessels enables steel to be recycled at 
a much lower cost than importing and processing iron (ILO 2004a:4). For these 
countries buying old vessels for scrapping is a profitable market and industry with an 
important job-creating effect. Furthermore it is arguable that the recovery of the 
enormous amounts of steel is an environmentally sound way of disposing old ships, 
compared to for example dumping at sea. On the contrary, others argue that the industry 
represents the downside of globalisation because of its environmental and human health 
impacts - and demonstrates a need for effective international regulation.   
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Working Conditions and Environmental Impacts 
 
As mentioned, the International Metalworker’s Federation defines scrapping of ships as 
one of the most work-intensive and dangerous jobs there are (www.imfmetal.org). The 
most common hazards are workers’ exposure to asbestos and other toxic material 
removed from the vessels by hand, risks of explosions, lack of basic safety equipment 
and other workers’ safety issues. Many of the hazardous materials used in the past to 
build a ship are restricted or banned today, but a ship built 20 or 30 years ago still 
contains these materials. In Box 3 the typical hazardous constituents are listed:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 3: Toxic Constituents in Obsolete Vessels 
  
 
Since the ship scrapping operations in Alang take place at the beach, toxic and other 
wastes are simply dumped at sea or burned on the beach with the help of residue oil 
from the ships. According to a Greenpeace delegation which traveled to Alang in 1999 
to document the conditions at the ship scrapping facilities “a deep blue smoke can be 
seen for many miles inland” and “the combustion processes are also contaminating 
people living in neighboring areas” (Greenpeace 1999:19-20). The report documents 
the findings by photographs and analyses of samples collected at the docks. In the report 
from the tour one of the participants states that the first thing that strikes a visitor is the 
careless handling of asbestos without any kind of safeguards: “the trained eye in 
asbestos detection sees the material everywhere: on the ships, next to the ship, on the 
Toxic constituents typically found in obsolete vessels destined for shipbreaking: 
 
• Asbestos 
• PBC (polychlorinated biphenyls) 
• Hydraulic fluids 
• lead from paint, lead ballast, batteries, generators and motor components 
• Tributyltin (TBT) antifouling coatings and contaminated holding tanks. 
• Heavy metals from ship transducers, ballast and paint coatings 
• Mercury from fluorescent light tubes, thermometers, electrical switches, light fittings, 
fire detectors and tank level indicators  
• Cloroflorocarbons (CFCs) in self-contained refrigeration devices such as water 
coolers and small freezer units 
• Flammable liquids such as lubricants and residual fuel 
 
 (Greenpeace 1999) (www.osha.gov)
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beach, in big bowls on the heads of women and on uncontrolled dumps on the land 
behind” (Ibid:10). These are just two out of many examples of observed environmental 
and health conditions from Alang.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture 2: Working Conditions at Alang Beach 
 
 
a 
 b 
c 
a) Ship wreck at Alang 
b) Workers scrapping a 
ferry 
c) Asbestos is picked 
apart with bare hands 
 
(Pictures from www.ban.org)
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Chapter Discussion  
 
In general there is a lack of exact knowledge about both short-term and long-term 
environmental and human health impacts of some types of the toxic material involved in 
ship scrapping operations. Some of the short term impacts on workers’ health and safety 
are easily identified though, for example the risks associated with working without basic 
safety equipment as well as the documented negative effects of uncontrolled handling of 
asbestos. These are also the dangers that are most frequently referred to in the debate 
about ‘Kong Frederik IX’. Long term human health and environmental impacts are also 
repeatedly referred to as an argument for regulating the activity of ship scrapping, 
despite the scientific uncertainty related to these issues, by those in favour of principles 
such as the precautionary principle and the proximity principle (as applied for example 
in the Basel Convention and the relevant EU regulation). Others argue that regulation 
should only be developed according to “certain” research and knowledge to avoid 
unnecessary regulation of the market by prohibiting certain activities and materials 
whose negative impacts are not carefully proved or tested.  
 
The research we have studied on ship scrapping in Asia indicates that the most obvious 
and concrete danger in relation to the ship scrapping activity is the lack of basic safety 
equipment that results in a high risk working environment for the workers on the 
beaches of Alang and other places. Most can agree that there is a problem when faced 
with the working conditions at the scrapping yards in Alang, India, but there are 
differing opinions on how the problem is best solved. One basic disagreement is 
whether it is preferable to avoid the health and environmental risks associated with ship 
scrapping by not having the ships scrapped at beaches in e.g. India and instead having 
the work carried out within the OECD (the origin of the ships/problem) or at least 
demanding higher standards at the scrapping yards of Asia. An opposing standpoint is 
that it might be a better option not to impose regulation and restrictions on the matter, 
because it could leave thousands of poor people in India without a job. Is it better to 
have a dangerous, high-risk job than no job at all? This discussion points to the fact that 
we are dealing with a complex environmental and socio-economic problem involving 
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many very different stakeholders, meaning that a “simple” or “straightforward” solution 
is impossible to point out.  
 
The above discussion on how the different ways in which the safety and environmental 
impacts of ship scrapping can be perceived should be seen in the light of the general 
disagreement and uncertainty that surrounds issues of management of hazardous waste 
and its short and long-term impacts. A good example to illustrate the different views 
and the stakeholder influence on the opinion and decision making in such complex 
situations is the case of Brent Spar15. It came into public prominence in1995, when the 
British government announced its support for Shell’s plans to dump Brent Spar in deep 
Atlantic waters. After Greenpeace ran a high-profile media campaign against the 
dumping, calls for boycotts of Shell, and a three week long occupation of Brent Spar, 
Shell abandoned the plans to dispose of Brent Spar at sea, whilst continuing to stand by 
the viewpoint that it would have been the most responsible solution in regards to both 
safety and environmental impacts. An independent consultant group later stated that the 
scientific material used to support Greenpeace’s argumentation was flawed and that 
Shell actually had the right on their side. (www.gre.ac.uk) 
 
The impacts of ship scrapping and the different views on how to solve the problems 
related to the issue show that ship scrapping poses a complex situation in the sense that 
it has problematic impacts in relation to health and environment - but as the description 
of the market shows, it also has an important job creating effect in Asia. It is tempting to 
describe and treat the stakeholder landscape as two opposing camps: one interested in 
keeping the current situation of flexible regulation to secure a natural market 
development that eventually will take care of the problems related to the industry of 
ship scrapping. The other camp being stakeholders interested in stricter regulation as a 
way to lower the risk of health and environmental impacts. But as our analysis will 
show, this is a too simple way of looking at the scenario.  
                                                
15 Brent Spar was a floating oil storage and loading buoy used until 1991 by Shell in the North Sea (www.uyseg.org)   
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Chapter 6: Ship Scrapping - the Regulative Landscape  
 
In this chapter the complex regulative landscape that relates to ship scrapping will be 
presented and discussed. Internationally, the issue of regulating ship scrapping is 
addressed by various agreements, institutions and regimes but there is not one specific 
set of regulation that addresses the issue overall. Below we describe regulation that can 
be said to apply to ship scrapping, focusing on case relevance. The presentation of the 
regulative landscape is divided into three groups; 1) environmental regulation, 2) 
regulation on workers’ rights, and 3) trade regulation - all described at international, 
regional16, national and local levels. The chapter is ended by a chapter discussion where 
major points, including the current situation and negotiations, are discussed. 
 
Environmental Regulation  
 
Environmental regulation related to ship scrapping can be identified at different levels: 
internationally we have the Basel Convention on Transboundary Movements of 
Hazardous Waste and regulation under the International Maritime Organization (IMO); 
regionally there is the EEC regulation on shipments of waste; and at the national level 
the Danish and Indian environmental regulations are relevant.   
 
The International Level 
The 1989 Basel Convention and the Basel Ban Amendment 
The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous 
Wastes and Their Disposal’ (the Basel Convention) is an international convention that 
aims at controlling and regulating international trade and transport of hazardous wastes. 
The convention is currently signed by 166 (www.basel.int 1) countries including the 
European Union. The Convention rests on several principles, among them the 
Precautionary Principle17, the Polluter Pays Principle18, and the Proximity Principle19.  
                                                
16 In this report ‘regional’ regulation refers to the EEC regulation. 
17The Basel Convention can be said to rest on the Precautionary Principle, given the imperfect knowledge and 
uncertainty about particularly the long term impacts of import/export of hazardous waste (OECD 1998:5) 
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In relation to our case the so-called Basel Ban, an amendment to the Basel Convention, 
becomes relevant since it: “…calls for prohibiting exports of hazardous wastes (for any 
purpose) from countries listed in a proposed new annex to the Convention (Annex VIII - 
Parties that are members of the EU, OECD, Liechtenstein) to all other Parties to the 
Convention. In order to enter into force, the Ban amendment has to be ratified by two 
thirds of the Parties who accepted it” (www.basel.int 2). The purpose of the Ban is to 
protect developing countries that traditionally have received big amounts of hazardous 
waste from developed countries, and to force the exporting countries to manage the 
hazardous waste responsibly - preferably in the producing country itself. As a 
consequence of the Ban, it can be interpreted that ships intended for scrapping can be 
classified as hazardous waste and as such illegal to transport from an OECD country 
(e.g. Denmark) to a non-OECD country (e.g. India) for scrapping, but there is no 
general agreement among the different stakeholders on this. Denmark, as a part of the 
EEC, has implemented the Ban in its legislation, but to enter into force internationally it 
needs to be ratified by 62 parties to the Basel Convention. At the time of writing it is 
ratified by 61 parties (www.ban.org 2).  
 
The issue of ship scrapping represents a challenge for the Basel Convention and the 
Basel Ban amendment. Many materials found onboard an end-of-life vessel is on the 
Basel list of hazardous waste, but the status of the Ban’s applicability to ship scrapping 
is somewhat unclear. According to e.g. the ILO, it is difficult to implement it in the ship 
scrapping context since it is not developed for the particular case of disposal of end-of-
life vessels (Andersen 2001). Furthermore Greenpeace finds that the convention and the 
Ban are ineffectual at completely regulating end-of-life vessels as hazardous waste 
export (Puckett 2000). In short, Greenpeace and BAN find that the Basel Convention is 
the right forum for regulation of ship scrapping, but it needs to be specified in order to 
be effective. Other stakeholders, mainly the industry, argue that end-of-life vessels are 
                                                                                                                                                            
18 As the name suggests the Polluter Pays Principle means that the responsible for generating pollution (the polluter) has 
to pay for the safe and environmentally sound disposal of it, thereby giving incentive to prevent pollution. 
19 The Proximity Principle can be explained as one “by which the disposal of hazardous wastes must take place as close 
as possible to their point of generation, recognizing that economically and environmentally sound management of some 
wastes will be achieved at specialized facilities located at greater distances from the point of generation” (OECD 
1998:7). 
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not waste, but a product and therefore cannot fall under the rules of the Basel 
Convention. There is disagreement among the stakeholders on whether the development 
of ship scrapping regulation should take place within the Basel framework or in another 
forum like for example the IMO, but at least among the Danish stakeholders there seem 
to be an increasing agreement of the IMO as a good framework for a new and binding 
regulation of ship scrapping. For the NGOs and the opposition to accept this, they stress 
that this new regulation should respect the Basel legislation and be obliged to not setting 
lower standards.   
 
Regarding the specific ‘Kong Frederik IX’ case, the Basel Convention has been referred 
to and disputed in the correspondence between the Danish and Indian authorities. Most 
other stakeholders who have participated in the debate have also referred to the 
Convention and the Ban continuously. Worth noting is also that it has been discussed if 
the case could and should be tried under the Implementation and Compliance 
Mechanism under the Basel Convention in order to settle whether the Basel regulation 
has been violated or not. Only parties to the convention, in the specific case, Denmark, 
can make a submission to the committee that administers the mechanism, but 
throughout the course of the case the Danish Minister for the Environment has refused 
to make use of this option, arguing that the mechanism is only a tool that offers non-
binding and non-confronting guidance. (www.mim.dk 2) (Minister’s Parliamentary 
Consultation 2/11 2005) 
 
IMO and the 1972 London Dumping Convention (1996 Protocol)  
As mentioned above, the latest development points towards the IMO as the framework 
where future regulation of ship scrapping will be negotiated. At present the IMO 
participates in a joint working group with the ILO and the Basel Convention secretariat 
on developing a common language between these organizations to ease future 
cooperation. In the IMO, discussions on development of future regulative measures 
related to ship scrapping are undertaken by the Marine Environment Protection 
Committee (MEPC).  
  
One convention administered by the IMO, the Convention on the Prevention of Marine 
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matters (the London Convention) can be 
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said to indirectly regulate issues related to ship scrapping. It covers deliberate disposal 
of wastes and other matter from vessels at sea. The convention does not address the 
topic of ship scrapping specifically, but it has developed guidelines for the assessment 
of wastes and other matter that may be considered for dumping of vessels (Andersen 
2001:50). 
 
The Regional Level 
The 1993 Council Regulation (EU) No. 259/93 
This regulation concerns the Supervision and Control of Shipments of Waste within, 
into and out of the European Union (Stuer-Lauridsen 2003:9). It transposes the 
provisions of the Basel Convention to the EU. According to this regulation an end-of-
life vessel destined for dismantling is to be considered hazardous waste. This applies for 
ships that are not properly emptied of cargo or of other materials arising from the 
operation of the vessel that may be classified as a dangerous substance or (hazardous) 
waste20 (www.greenpeaceweb.org 2). Some EU member states interpret and enforce this 
regulation more strictly than others, e.g. Holland, where in 2002 the highest Council of 
State ruled that a ship destined for scrapping in Alang, India, containing asbestos, heavy 
metals and other toxic materials, should be classified as toxic waste. This was the first 
legal recognition that a ship containing hazardous constitutions should be treated as 
hazardous waste (www.greenpeaceweb.org 3). NGOs as Greenpeace and BAN hoped 
that this decision would set up the precedent that in the future all end-of-life vessels 
must be cleaned of toxic materials before being sent to for example India. As the ‘Kong 
Frederik IX’ and other examples show, this was not the case.  
 
According to the IMO rules that apply to ships internationally, a ship falls under the 
regulation of the port state or flag state, i.e. the state where the ship is registered. The 
flag a ship flies determines what regulations it must abide at sea. Therefore many 
register under so-called flags of convenience21 (FOC). The EU regulative opens up for 
                                                
20 In line with the waste versus product debate referred to earlier in the report, the notion of ‘decontamination’ is also 
challenged: some stakeholders claim that a decontaminated ship is simply a ship without cargo.  
21 FOC is a ship registration system that offers low taxes or fees, lax domestic regulations and little enforcement of 
international conventions. Countries like Panama, Liberia and Cypress are popular to ship owners in this aspect. 
Research shows that FOC ships sink more often, pollute more, are less safe and tend to violate international labour 
standards and international conventions more often. (Murphy 1998).   
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the possibility of interpreting the port state as the port from which the ship departs (port 
of export), instead of the port state being the flag state. This is important because, if 
enforced, it could prevent one of the most popular and common ways for the shipping 
industry to circumvent international environmental regulation.  
 
The EU regulation is important in relation to the ‘Kong Frederik IX’ case because 
Denmark has adopted it. Together with the national waste regulation it constitutes the 
legal framework wherein the case has been taking place up until the ferry left Danish 
waters. The regulation was for instance referred to by the Danish seller to establish that 
he had complied with all the relevant regulation. During the media attention on the case 
the Danish Minister for the Environment promised to work for internationally binding 
rules for ship scrapping also at the EU level – via the EU forum.  
 
The National Level 
Denmark 
Denmark is a party to the Basel Convention and in Denmark administration and 
management of waste related matters is allocated to the local municipalities. So in a 
case like ‘Kong Frederik IX’, the municipality of Korsør has the task of assuring that 
the rules of the Basel Convention, the EU, the national laws, etc., are abided. The case 
has actually spurred a debate on whether this responsibility should move from local to 
national level, and a law amendment was submitted in December 2005 (Politiken 18/12 
2005 ). This discussion was initiated by the Minister of the Environment. Some 
stakeholders have suggested that a ship registration system administered at the national 
level should be implemented in order to prevent future cases (Jacob Hartmann, 
interview 10/8 2005).  
 
India 
India is also a party to the Basel Convention, but opposite Denmark, India has not yet 
ratified the Basel Ban. It can be difficult for an outsider to obtain a comprehensive 
overview of the regulative system concerning ship scrapping in India. Nationally and 
locally a host of authorities are meant to regulate ship scrapping: locally the Gujarat 
Maritime Board along with the Gujarat Pollution Control Board; and at the national 
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level offices under the Ministry of Environment and Forests are responsible (The Indian 
Express 25/10 2003).   
 
A Supreme Court order from 2003 mandates the decontamination of ships prior to 
import into India (The Indian Express 20/5 2005), but according to several sources 
enforcement is very poor. The Central Pollution Board in Delhi has prepared 
environmental guidelines for ship scrapping industries aiming to “…minimize the effect 
of ship scrapping industries on the surrounding environment through proper siting of 
industries and by preparing an environmental management plan and a disaster 
management plan”. The monitoring on implementation of the environmental 
management plan is the responsibility of the Gujarat Pollution Control Board. 
(Andersen 2001:37) 
 
Under Indian law, imports of toxic waste from OECD countries and ship scrapping 
work in tidal ocean zones are prohibited. The Indian Supreme Court decided in May 
1997 that: "No import should be made or permitted by any authority or any person of 
any hazardous waste which is already banned under the Basel Convention or to be 
banned hereafter with effect from the date specified therein." Besides this, several other 
Supreme Court judgments reaffirm that the Government of India is obliged to promptly 
incorporate international conventions to which it is a party. Furthermore, the Central 
Pollution Control Board states in its "Environmental Guidelines for Ship Scrapping 
Industries" that: "Old vessels containing or contaminated with any 
of the above substances [PBCs, waste asbestos dust and fiber, lead and lead 
compounds] are accordingly classified as hazardous materials. The customs authority 
and/or the concerned State Maritime Board should ensure this and issue a certificate to 
this effect that the vessel is free from the prohibited materials." (Greenpeace 1999:22).  
 
In the specific case a committee under the Supreme Court first recommended that the 
ship should be send back to Denmark, referring to earlier Supreme Court directives and 
to the Basel Convention. Later the committee revised this view. We will return to this 
aspect of the case later in the report.  
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Summary 
Most of the above mentioned international environmental regulation can be said to 
apply to ship scrapping, but there is an ongoing discussion on whether or not it is 
suitable for the field. The international agreements mentioned above are at the moment 
the most important binding intergovernmental tools in the context of ship scrapping 
(Andersen 2001:36). An the national level it is striking that Denmark has no regulation 
applying directly to ship scrapping, and that the Indian regulation concerning ship 
scrapping is questioned in terms of effect and enforcement. Some stakeholders, 
especially environmentalists and NGOs are pressuring to specify the international 
regulation to apply directly to ship scrapping, while the shipping industry and various 
industrialized countries are fighting against stricter regulation. Recently work has been 
commenced to develop specific international regulation on ship scrapping. At this initial 
stage a joint Basel/ILO/IMO working group has been established to undertake a 
comprehensive examination of the respective guidelines adopted by the three 
organizations, with a view to identifying any possible gap, overlap, or ambiguity 
(www.imo.org 1). It is important to stress that the joint working group solely has an 
advisory purpose and no legislative competences. It is an attempt to develop a common 
language and respect between the different regimes. (Lone Schou, interview 10/10 
2005) 
 
Regulation on Workers’ Rights 
 
For the purpose of this report workers’ safety and workers’ rights issues are focused on 
the Indian context. As the case description points out, the concerns of having ‘Kong 
Frederik IX’ scrapped at Alang are primarily related to workers’ health and safety 
issues. Below we present the international regulation on workers’ rights, represented by 
the ILO and the national and local Indian regulations.  
 
The International Labour Organization (ILO) 
The International Labour Organization is a specialized UN agency, which seeks the 
promotion of social justice and internationally recognized human and labour rights. The 
ILO formulates international labour standards in the form of conventions and 
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recommendations, setting minimum standards of basic labour rights (www.ilo.org). In 
relation to ship scrapping, the ILO is engaged in various ways: it has developed safety 
guidelines and a best practice compendium for the ship scrapping industry specifically 
intended for Asia. Also, it publishes papers on the issue and conducts assessments on 
the matter. It is currently participating in the before mentioned joint working group with 
the Basel convention and the IMO on ‘achieving a common understanding of the 
problem [of ship scrapping] and the character of the required solutions’ (ILO 2004b:1). 
The ILO also engages in awareness activities and has produced a documentary video on 
occupational and health issues in ship scrapping (Andersen 2001:45).  
  
The ILO guidelines and standards influence the ‘Kong Frederik IX’ case indirectly 
through the ILO’s work in the IMO/ILO/Basel joint work group and via the general 
recognition that ILO’s work receives worldwide. Since most of the stakeholders on the 
Danish side as well as the NGOs are concerned with the workers’ health and safety 
issues related to the case, the ILO standards and specific guidelines on ship scrapping 
are referred to throughout the debate on ‘Kong Frederik IX’.   
 
Indian Regulation 
In 1999 India’s central Pollution Control Board issued guidelines for ship scrapping 
operations that included safety and environmental measures. Earlier in 1998 the Gujarat 
High Court and later Supreme Court issued directives to improve working conditions, 
provide water, sanitation and health facilities to the work force. (The Indian Express 
24/6 2003) Among the Asian countries there are differences in the hazardous materials 
requirements: officially India demands a “gas-free” certificate while for example 
Pakistan and Bangladesh do not (Stuer-Lauridsen 2003:16).  According to the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO), all ship scrapping countries have, in principle, 
introduced gas-free certificates, but the enforcement is vague and varies from country to 
country (Göhre 2000:2). In another report, the ILO states that insufficiencies in relation 
to worker’s safety, health and to the protection of the environment have been affirmed 
by several independent assessments (Andersen 2001:36). 
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Trade Regulation 
 
International trade regulation affects trade with end-of-life vessels and the ship 
scrapping industry. Since the ships intended for scrapping are sold internationally, they 
fall under both international, regional, and national trade rules. Below we present the 
dominant trade regime, the WTO, and the trade organization that represents the shipping 
industry, the ICS. 
 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) 
The WTO is an international organization dealing with the global rules of trade between 
nations. Its main function is to ensure that trade flows as smoothly, predictably and 
freely as possible (www.wto.org 1). The WTO sets the rules for international trade 
through agreements on tariffs and taxes, technical trade barriers, patents, import 
limitations, etc (Friis Bach 1999:7). The WTO agreements have a significant impact on 
what the different countries produce and on what other regulation on e.g. health and 
environmental issues they can implement (Ibid:7). The WTO is concerned with 
environmental regulation issues from the point of view that their concern is to make 
sure that environmental regulation does not influence the WTO trade rules in a negative 
way. Some international environmental agreements, including the Basel Convention, 
contain trade measures. It still needs to be determined whether such trade measures 
enjoy the protection of WTO disciplines or if they could be challenged under those 
disciplines (Ferrentino 1997:67). The relevant article under the WTO in this regard, the 
so-called article XX, determines that in certain cases under certain conditions countries 
can ignore the normal WTO principles and rules by e.g. introducing an import ban (Friis 
Bach 1999:68) It is subject to on-going discussion whether the rules of WTO are 
compatible with stricter environmental regulation in general and with a field as ship 
scrapping specifically. Another “blurred” issue is whether the article XX opens up for 
the possibility of introducing environmental regulation based on the Precautionary 
Principle restricting free trade (Ibid:70). In the case of regulating ship scrapping this is a 
highly relevant question.  
 
 44 
 
The before-mentioned waste versus product dispute is founded in a basic conflict 
between trade rules and environmental regulation. As many other global activities, the 
issue of ship scrapping is located between these two types of regulation. As the analysis 
will show, the ‘Kong Frederik IX’ case contains this element too: confronted with the 
existing environmental regulation many of the stakeholders refer to the international 
trade rules as an alternative way of interpreting the situation.  
 
The International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) 
The International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) is the international trade association for 
merchant ship operators. The ICS represents the collective views of the international 
industry from different nations, sectors and trades (www.marisec.org 1). The ICS 
represents one of the world’s largest industries and - according to their opponents – it 
continuously stresses that it does not have to abide the rules of the Basel Convention 
regarding waste dumping. Obviously, it seeks to use their influence in the IMO to make 
the development of new regulation less rigorous than the Basel Convention. 
(www.greenpeace.org 1)  
 
Chapter Discussion 
 
Due to a number of factors the industry of ship scrapping and the trade in end-of-life 
vessels is complicated to regulate.  
 
One factor is that the industry is global and border-crossing. This complicates the 
legislative situation because, as shown, many different types of regulation at different 
levels and concerning different aspects of ship scrapping exist22. This is well illustrated 
by the case of ‘Kong Frederik IX’, where various regulative frameworks are at play, e.g. 
national Danish and Indian legislation, the Basel Convention, the EEC regulative, etc. 
Often these different regulative frameworks do not interact in an appropriate way and 
                                                
22 At a general level the shipping industry can be said to be global and border-crossing in the sense that a ship owner 
can be from country a, the ship registered in flag state b, the captain from country c, the ship anchored in country d or 
sailing in international waters on its way from country e to country f perhaps to be scrapped or sold again in country g.  
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confusion easily occurs as to which has precedence over the other. As for example trade 
rules vs. environmental rules.  
 
Another factor is that the perception of ship scrapping varies a great deal among the 
many different stakeholders. As mentioned, some consider ship scrapping a natural way 
of making a living for poor people that may not have alternatives, while others want the 
phenomenon stopped or at least strictly regulated in order to minimize environmental 
and health impacts. The difference in perception is also illustrated by the before 
mentioned difference in the term used to describe ship scrapping. For example the IMO 
chooses to call it ship recycling instead of for example ship scrapping or breaking.  
 
Regarding the international regulation there is the issue of how or if the various 
legislation, rules and agreements interact. Do they complement each other or do they 
weaken each other? Which have precedence over the other? As indicated, the 
relationship between trade rules and international environmental agreements and 
national legislation is unclear. An agreement as the Basel Convention, whose rules can 
be argued to apply to ship scrapping, contains trade restrictions. Thus the parties to the 
convention are obliged to impose trade restrictions on imports and exports of hazardous 
waste. Specifically in relation to ship scrapping the obligation is not so clear, though, 
and is therefore often circumvented because stakeholders disagree on whether an end-
of-life vessel should be classified as a waste or as a product. If it is classified as a 
product it is much more difficult to impose restrictions on it. In the concrete case of 
‘Kong Frederik IX’ for example, the Indian Minister for the Environment and Forests 
refused to consider the ship a waste, because it could still sail.  
 
Many of the hazardous constituents in an end-of-life vessel are on the list of hazardous 
materials under the Basel Ban, and in theory the Ban therefore applies to these vessels. 
It is discussed by the different stakeholders, though, whether the entire vessel can be 
classified as waste or if only the individual parts of the ships that contain hazardous 
material can be classified as such. There are different approaches to this dilemma, 
which leads to different interpretations, and consequently more or less allows for the 
industry to circumvent the rules of the Basel Convention, referring to the WTO and free 
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trade in products. One argument used by the industry is that when an end-of-life vessel 
is sold as a product instead of as a waste, it falls under the rules of trade regimes, such 
as the WTO.  In relation to the compatibility of the Basel Convention to trade 
agreements such as the WTO this “definitions dispute” is essential. Is an end-of-life-
vessel a product containing some hazardous components, or is the entire vessel to be 
classified as waste? A lack of clear definitions is another factor complicating the matter 
of regulating internationally and making it difficult to implement the intentions and the 
different rules in practice. 
 
Environmentalists generally think that it should become clear that environmental 
agreements have precedence over trade rules. But there is a variety of opinions on that 
matter. Many developing countries are sceptical towards such a change in the WTO 
rules or other agreements that allow for national environmental regulation to be 
implemented, because they fear that the developed countries will use national 
environmental regulation to keep their commodities out of the market (Friis Bach 
1999:75). 
 
The purpose of chapters 5 and 6 has been to make a starting point for the analysis and 
provide the reader with knowledge about ship scrapping and case-related issues. It 
should be clear after chapter 5 that ship scrapping can be said to pose problems in 
regards to environmental, health and safety impacts and after chapter 6 that the 
phenomenon is complicated to regulate because of the complex regulative landscape 
that surrounds it. In short, the chapters indicate that we are dealing with a setting 
characterised by uncertainty, complexity and polarization, which makes it appropriate to 
conduct the narrative policy analysis in the following chapters.  
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Chapter 7: Stakeholder Identification and Characterization 
 
In the following we will identify the stakeholders relevant to the case of ‘Kong Frederik 
IX’. The stakeholders can be identified at various levels. Since the focus of this report is 
international regulation, the prominent stakeholders at this level will be introduced first. 
Subsequently, Denmark and India will be introduced, as the state level actors are 
dominant actors on the international policy making scene. This leads to identifying the 
important non-state actors, who in this case have been influential at various levels. 
These non-state actors are the sellers and buyers, the so-called Green Coalition, and a 
few other examples of groups and individuals that have influenced this specific case and 
– perhaps even more importantly – its political aftermath.  
 
The International level 
 
The relevant stakeholders at this level are the UN organizations described in the 
previous chapter that regulate within the field of ship scrapping, viz. the IMO, the ILO 
and the Basel Convention. Indirectly the WTO - who regulates goods traded 
internationally - is also an important stakeholder, since some actors argue that ships are 
goods (products) and therefore fall under this regime.  
 
The UN organizations all have different focuses and each of them struggle to be the 
dominant forum in which the internationally binding ship scrapping regulation should 
be developed. The three organizations have initiated the before-mentioned joint working 
group as a way of beginning to cooperate on the issue, but it is important to stress that 
this working group serves only as advisory to the three organs and thus influences the 
development of rules only indirectly. The different organizations each have to justify 
their relevance and existence and ‘deliver a product’ to the clients: the national member 
states who contribute to their budgets. The struggle between the international 
organizations is relevant for our analysis, since part of the rhetoric battles are taking 
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place on this international scene, within and between the various organizations and its 
members, the sovereign states23.  
 
The State Level 
 
At state level the Danish and the Indian state systems are the central actors in the case of 
‘Kong Frederik IX’. They are directly involved at various levels - both locally, 
nationally, regionally and internationally. Both Denmark and India have ratified 
international agreements and conventions (like the Basel Convention and the WTO 
regime), which are at play in the ‘Kong Frederik IX’ case. As the analysis will show, 
the two states have different views on how to interpret the international regulation and 
on how to act in the international negotiation processes, which again gives us clues 
about their individual priorities.  
 
Denmark 
Denmark considers itself an “environmental pioneer” in some respects (in its recent 
work in the EEC and the IMO for binding regulation of ship scrapping for example) and 
environmental issues generally have a high priority on the political agenda. Denmark 
also sees its role in the development of the Basel Convention and the Basel Ban as 
central (www.mim.dk 4).  
 
The Danish and the Indian state systems are different in regards to implementing 
international regulation in a national and local context. As mentioned in chapters 4 and 
6, the responsibility for waste issues is allocated to the local level in the Danish system, 
making the local municipality of Korsør a central stakeholder in the Danish context. In 
practice, the implementation of the Basel regulation in the ‘Kong Frederik IX’ case has 
been a task of the local municipality of Korsør, even though the state bears the overall 
responsibility. According to the decentralized waste management practices, the national 
authorities have only offered guidance and advice during the case and let the 
                                                
23 Even though these international institutions do not hold the most prominent role in the specific ‘Kong Frederik IX’ 
case (where it is the bilateral action between the state actors that is central) they are significant stakeholders in relation 
to the ship scrapping field in general and deserve “separate” attention, i.e. attention to their role and interests as 
stakeholders separate from the interests of their member states.  
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municipality take the final decision. The ‘Kong Frederik IX’ case has led to a concrete 
law amendment that suggests moving the competencies in cases like this to the national 
level (Lone Schou, interview 10/10 2005). The fact that the case has led to a law 
amendment moved by the minister, suggests that the Ministry has not been satisfied 
with the way the municipality of Korsør has handled the case. We have seen several 
examples of correspondence between the municipality and the DEPA that confirms that 
the DEPA has been dissatisfied with the work of the municipality, and that the 
municipality on the other hand has found the advice and interference of the DEPA 
inappropriate. It is fair to conclude from this that practical implementation of 
international regulation in the national and local context has been complicated. This 
again reflects the situation of the international regulation on the issue of ship scrapping 
as being unclear and open for interpretation  
 
Other actors at the Danish state level have been involved for a short period of time at 
different stages in the process. It is worth mentioning that the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs entered the case in May 2005, when he wrote a letter to his Indian colleague 
appealing for the ship to be returned. While the ship was still in the harbour of 
Halsskov, the Danish Maritime Authorities were involved in inspecting the ferry, and 
finally gave it permission to leave Danish waters. In relation to the purpose of this 
report these two state actors as well as the municipality of Korsør have only been 
important at the stage were the ship was still in Denmark. Their further role in the 
political aftermath, i.e. the policy making in regards to ship scrapping, is limited. 
 
Seen from a Danish perspective, the following state influenced stakeholders24 have been 
involved in the specific case of ‘Kong Frederik IX’:  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
24 By state influenced stakeholders we mean those institutions or organizations that the Danish state have a direct 
influence on, for example that the Danish state makes the laws which the local municipality has to implement and that 
the Danish state is a signatory to the Basel Convention and to treaties under the IMO.   
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Box 4: Stakeholders from a Danish Perspective 
 
 
The Danish Political Opposition 
The Danish political opposition involves several political parties, but in regards to this 
case the most dominant figure from the opposition has been Steen Gade from the party 
‘SF’ (the Socialist People's Party). The political opposition has used this case to demand 
the Minister of the Environment to put the issue on the political agenda both in 
Denmark and in the EU, the Basel framework and the IMO framework. Steen Gade has 
continuously drawn attention to the minister’s handling of the case and been an 
important figure in the media debate. He has a background as Director of the Danish 
Environmental Protection Agency from 1999 till 2003 and has been involved in 
environmental and international issues throughout his political career. He has worked 
closely with Greenpeace on this case. He considers his cooperation with the Minister of 
the Environment good. Even though he criticizes her for not going far enough in her 
attempts to get the ferry back or in her critique of the Indian authorities, he generally 
Local level 
• The Municipality of Korsør  
 
National level 
• The Danish Environmental       
Protection Agency 
• The Ministry of the Environment 
• The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Denmark 
• The Danish Maritime Authority 
 
Regional level 
• The European Union 
 
International Level  
• IMO 
• ILO 
• The Basel Convention 
• WTO 
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supports her line in the IMO negations on regulation of ship scrapping. (Steen Gade, 
interview 2/9 2005)  
 
India 
At state level in India several stakeholders can be identified in relation to the case since 
a range of offices hold responsibility in cases like this (see box 5 below), referring 
ultimately to the Minister for Environment and Forests. The Indian authorities have 
seemed divided on whether the ‘Kong Frederik IX’ case should be interpreted by use of 
the Indian national legislation or by use of the Basel legislation, which the Indian 
government has signed and ratified.  
 
During the process and the media debate, the issue of corruption has been brought up 
several times by critics of how the case has been handled25. According to a country 
study report by Transparency International26, corruption and unaccountability in the 
Indian political system is widespread (Jain 2004:26). In regards to the specific case 
there have been rumors of corruption at the local custom and coast guard level, 
indicating that the ship was allowed to be stranded in spite of several rules possibly 
being violated (www.greenpeace.org 3). As Ms. Dutta from the Corporate 
Accountability Desk puts it: “The Riky case has also exposed that all is not well in 
Alang and that the current practices of cheating, fraud and falsification of documents 
must be changed” (www.greenpeaceweb.org 4). Other articles refer to it as a well-
known fact that e.g. gas-free certificates can be bought and suggest that other 
permissions can be bought on the black market as well. We mention this aspect because 
it might explain some of the procedures in India that have been difficult for us to gain 
information and understanding about.  
 
Seen from an Indian state perspective, the following state influenced stakeholders have 
been involved in the specific case of ‘Kong Frederik IX’: 
  
                                                
25 For example by Greenpeace India and other members of ‘The Green Coalition’ (which will be presented later in this 
chapter), who in an article refer to investigations of underworld connections in Alang carried out by the Indian Defence 
Department (www.greenpeaceweb.org 5 ) 
26 Transparency International a global non-governmental organization concerned with fighting corruption 
(www.transparency.org). 
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Box 5: Stakeholders from an Indian Perspective. 
 
 
The Indian Political Opposition 
It would be natural to bring a presentation of the Indian political opposition and its position in 
relation to the ‘Kong Frederik IX’ case here, but representatives from political parties in the 
opposition have not expressed themselves in the media, even though there has been political 
disagreement in India about how the case should be handled. This disagreement seems to have 
been between different authorities and official institutions and has apparently not incited 
statements from other political parties – at least not in a media obtainable to us. This does not 
mean that the view of the government has not been challenged: a rather active and opposition 
to the policy of the government has come from a range of NGOs, as will be presented below.   
 
 
Local level 
• Gujarat Maritime Board  
• Gujarat Pollution Control Board 
• Bhavnagar Customs  
 
State level    
• The Gujarat Coastal Zone Regulation 
Authorities 
• The Gujarat Port Authorities 
 
National level 
• The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of India 
• The Ministry of Environment and 
Forests  
• The Central Pollution Board 
• The Indian Supreme Court  
 
International Level  
• IMO 
• ILO 
• The Basel Convention 
• WTO 
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Non-state actors 
This group of stakeholders is very diverse and can be identified at different levels and 
on various geographical and political scenes. Some of the stakeholders have had a direct 
role in the concrete course of events in the ‘Kong Frederik IX’ case (for example the 
sellers and buyers of the ferry), while others have played an important role in the 
political course of events and in the media debate that has followed the case. 
  
Sellers and Buyers 
The ‘Kong Frederik IX’ case contains of course a basic element of trade with a product 
(regardless if the product is labelled waste or not): KFIX A/S announced that the ferry 
was for sale and received different offers from interested buyers, of which a St. Vincent 
based letterbox-company came up with the highest bid, and a contract was signed. 
Subsequently, the ship was sold again a chain of selling and  
buying stakeholders can therefore be identified: 
 
 
Box 6: ‘Kong Frederik IX’ – Sellers and Buyers. 
 
Characteristic of these companies is that they are generally small and unknown 
companies outside the interests of the media, or of the public. KFIX is the Danish 
company that bought the ferry in 2002 and sold it again to Tummel Ltd, a letterbox 
company supposedly “invented” to buy the ferry. Since the company has its address in 
St. Vincent, this Island was now the flag state, meaning that the ferry was obliged to the 
practically non-existing regulation of St. Vincent. Tummel Ltd. then hired Jupiter Ship 
Management to handle the ferry on its continued journey to Alang, where the Alang-
based Shreeji Shipping Agency specialized in scrapping ships took over the ferry. The 
Mumbai based Jupiter Ship Management has a reputation of sending ships directly to 
• KFIX A/S 
• Letterbox-company registered in St. Vincent, Tummel Ltd.  
• Jupiter Ship Management 
• Alang-based ship scrapping company: Shreeji Shipping Agency 
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scrapping and has recently (in 2004) sent an old ship bought in Denmark to scrapping 
without permission from the Danish authorities (GP notification 9/3-05) (Government 
Office Vestsjælland 7/4 2005). The chain of sellers and buyers, and the fact that the 
ferry was bought and sold several times in order for it to go to Alang legally, illustrates 
how international regulation can be circumvented by the industry in a way that allows 
them to sell and buy scrap ships like ‘Kong Frederik IX’ without complying to any 
binding legal obligations.  
 
The Green Coalition 
The ‘Kong Frederik IX’ case has been significantly affected by this group of 
stakeholders: a self-proclaimed coalition of international and Indian NGOs and trade 
unions concerned with environmental and occupational health and safety issues. The 
Green Coalition has been most significant on the Indian scene where it has been very 
active at various stages of the case. The coalition has continuously provided the media 
with information and made concrete campaigns. The coalition consists of fairly diverse 
NGOs, in the sense that it consists of both environmental NGOs and trade unions:  
 
 
Box 7: The Green Coalition 
 
The most dominant members of the coalition at the international level are Greenpeace 
and BAN. Apart from joining this coalition, the two organizations have a strong 
cooperation on hazardous waste issues in general. Their relationship can be 
characterized as an alliance27, and the close ties can also be identified at the personal 
level in the sense that the founder of BAN is a former Greenpeace employee. 
Greenpeace is a worldwide NGO that runs campaigns on a wide range of environmental 
issues, whereas BAN is an NGO that works specifically with various aspects within the 
                                                
27 Alliance defined as in (Blowers 1996:28): Long-term allegiance to common ideals among trusted partners; regular 
consultation by post, fax, IT and personal meetings.  
• Greenpeace – both Greenpeace India and Greenpeace 
Nordic 
• Basel Action Network (BAN) and the BAN asbestos Network 
• The Centre for Indian Trade Unions (CITU) 
• Corporate Accountability Desk 
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issue of hazardous waste. Characteristic for both NGOs is that they are non-profit 
organizations, and they receive funding from private members exclusively in order to be 
100 percent free of commercial interests. Greenpeace does not accept funding from 
companies or governments (Seminar on NGO Accountability 3/5 2005).  
 
BAN and Greenpeace act as watchdogs in cases like ‘Kong Frederik IX’, and their 
status as non profit and independent organizations enables them to be critical towards 
decision makers (politicians) and the business society. They focus on the violation of 
international rules and conventions and of the principles they supposedly are built on 
like e.g. ‘the polluter pays principle’ and ‘the precautionary principle’. Throughout the 
debate they refer to the violation of these principles, in contrast to some of the other 
stakeholders’ more “pragmatic” arguments about economic feasibility and the 
importance of industrial and economic development. The work of especially 
Greenpeace can be said to be two-sided: while some Greenpeace activists quietly and 
pragmatically confer and lobby inside, others actively demonstrate outside in the streets 
or “on location”, signalling a more radical approach. In the case of ‘Kong Frederik IX’, 
Greenpeace has undertaken actions in the harbour of Halsskov to make the public aware 
of the case (www.greenpeace.se), while they have also been actively involved in the 
political aftermath e.g. in the negations within the IMO framework (Lone Schou, 
interview 10/10 2005).  
 
In India, the local Greenpeace branch has been very vigorous in communicating and 
sending information to a range of stakeholders on the Danish scene, both the Danish 
branch of Greenpeace, but also to the Danish political opposition and the Minister of the 
Environment. The Corporate Accountability Desk has played an important role in the 
political aftermath, since Ms. Dutta from this organization has initiated a Supreme 
Court trial of the case (Dutta 2005 a).  
 
Mogens Nørgaard Olesen, Citizen, Denmark 
Mogens N Olesen is an example of a private citizen who has attempted to influence and 
hold responsible the Danish decision makers in the case of ‘Kong Frederik IX’. He has 
been very dedicated in his work to try to keep ‘Kong Frederik IX’ in Denmark. His 
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primary wish was for the ferry to stay in the country to be restored and utilized as a 
museum because of its national and cultural values. After the ferry left, he has continued 
to fight to get it back. Among other things he has sent a complaint to the ministerial 
supervision department on municipalities about how the case was handled by Korsør 
municipality where he points at a range of things the municipality either was not aware 
of, or ignored. The complaint is very detailed and reveals a large knowledge on the 
issue. Other stakeholders we have talked to, such as Greenpeace and Steen Gade, have 
had contacts with him during the case and made use of his knowledge. Mogens 
Nørgaard Olesen’s motive for keeping the ferry has not so much been spurred by 
environmental concerns, but is rather actuated by a passion for ferries and this specific 
ferry in particular. Even though he did not achieve the result he wanted, his attempt 
shows that it is possible for a single person to influence a case like ‘Kong Frederik IX’, 
at least in the Danish national context. We have seen correspondence between 
politicians and civil servants from Korsør municipality that demonstrates that his 
continuous attempts to influence and criticize them has been seen as very inconvenient.  
It should be mentioned that even when the ferry was partly scrapped (September 2005), 
he still did not give up on having the ferry returned to Denmark. Neither has he given 
up his intention of having the relevant authorities and individuals held responsible. 
(Mogens Nørgaard Olesen, interview 30/9 2005) 
 
International Center for Occupational, Environmental and Public Health 
(ICOEPH)  
ICOEPH is a non-profit centre created through a network of Danish professionals and 
institutions concerned with occupational medicine and public health. The aim of the 
center is to improve health and environment in low-income countries 
(www.icoeph.com). This Danish organization entered the debate of the ‘Kong Frederik 
IX’ case by suggesting a Danish development aid project with the purpose of improving 
the working conditions in Alang (Jyllands-Posten 9/5 2005). The project suggested 
cooperation with the local industry and the local authorities on bringing the working and 
environmental conditions in Alang up to international standards (Politiken 9/5 2005b). 
The suggestion won broad political support, both from the government and the 
opposition (Information 9/5 2005).The Danish minister for development cooperation, 
 57 
 
Ulla Tørnæs, was positive towards the idea and agreed to present it to the Indian 
authorities, but emphasized that India had to welcome the idea, otherwise the project 
couldn’t be carried out (Politiken 9/5 2005b).  
 
Think Tanks: CEPOS, Denmark and the Liberty Institute, India 
These think tanks have been identified as stakeholders because of their contribution to 
the debate about the ‘Kong Frederik IX’ case. CEPOS is an independent liberalist think 
tank whose aim is to contribute to a society with more personal and economic freedom 
(www.cepos.dk). In June 2005 CEPOS invited Barun Mitra, one of the founders of the 
Indian think tank Liberty Institute to Denmark. According to their webpage, the Liberty 
Institute is …”an independent think tank dedicated to empowering the people by 
harnessing the power of the market.” (www.libertyindia.org). According to critics of 
the institute it is an extreme right wing anti regulation pressure group. In relation to the 
visit to Denmark, CEPOS published a working paper on ship scrapping inspired by the 
controversies between India and Denmark on the ‘Kong Frederik IX’ case. In the paper 
Barun Mitra argues that ship scrapping provides both a livelihood for the rural poor and 
their families, and makes a significant contribution to the steel and construction 
industries. According to Mitra …”free market principles will provide the economic 
growth which will benefit both the poor and the environment” (Mitra 2005:1). He 
accuses international regulation related to ship scrapping, especially the Basel 
Convention, of being counter-productive, actually making matters worse both for the 
environment and the workers involved in ship scrapping. He argues in favor of local 
regulation, keeping in mind the economic environment of the local community and the 
country (Ibid:11). He furthermore criticizes what he calls “non-accountable groups as 
Greenpeace” (Ibid) for influencing the Basel Convention and other international treaties 
that affect the economies of developing countries like India, since they are not 
accountable for their actions. Lastly he criticizes the Basel Convention and its 
supporters of being “anti-market, anti-environment and certainly against the interests of 
India” (Ibid:12). 
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Chapter 8 - The Dominant Narratives 
 
The following three chapters constitute the narrative policy analysis: chapter 8 is an 
analysis of the dominant narratives (Roe’s procedure step 1), chapter 9 examines the 
counternarratives (step 2), and chapter 10 contains the metanarrative and reflections on 
its usefulness (steps 3 and 4).  
 
This chapter has been divided into three parts named after the discourses of Ecological 
Modernization, Sustainable Development, and the Promethean discourse28 respectively, 
since these discourses – together with the notion of state sovereignty29 - have turned out 
to dominate the narrative landscape surrounding the case. At the end of the chapter we 
have included a chapter discussion. It is a case-specific analysis, which also includes the 
political aftermath the case has spurred in both Denmark, India, and internationally. 
Despite our openness towards the inclusion of all types of stakeholders, the two 
contending states, Denmark and India, have turned out be central in the analysis. They 
are a key to the examination of the struggle that goes on internationally30. But a wide 
range of non-state actors will also be included.  
 
With Roe (1994:155) in mind we will now proceed with step 1, viz. by studying the 
stories and arguments that dominate the issue in question.  
 
 
                                                
28 The Promethean discourse works with the assumption that technological innovation and a market free from 
government intervention will provide solutions to what others call environmental problems.   
29 State sovereignty refers to a condition in which states are not subject to any higher authority, and that the government 
of a state is ultimately responsible for its citizen. In practice sovereignty is often conditional, partly due to the existence 
of international rules and conventions, which means that a sovereign government is only free to choose within these 
frameworks. In the ‘Kong Frederik IX’ case the notion of state sovereignty is referred to in its simplest version: nobody 
is above the state. The aspect of how international regimes limit sovereignty is basically ignored. (Baylis 2001:337) 
30 The central position of the state actors in the ’Kong Frederik IX’ case can partly be explained by the “un-established” 
nature of the ship scrapping field. Once a regime has been established – if this happens - the states will transfer their 
regulative competences in cases like ‘Kong Frederik IX’ to the relevant international institutions. For a comment on the 
general relationship between state actors and international institutions see footnote 23.  
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Part 1: Ecological Modernization 
 
The Discourse 
The discourse of Ecological Modernization has its roots in Western Europe, and is a 
conception of the Western European development process as the solution to the 
environmental problems faced by (all) societies today. In this concept there is no 
conflicting relationship between economy and environment. On the contrary: if a 
society’s macro economic level is managed correctly, it will lead to environmental 
benefits. The basic features of the discourse are government intervention (for example 
introduction of incentives for the industry, development of institutional capacity, and 
integration of environmental goals into all policy areas), a positive attitude towards 
industrial partners, and a faith in the potential of technological innovation. Intervention 
is long-term, preventive, and based on holistic analyses including both environmental 
and economical aspects, and the regulative means are typically green taxes, 
certification, standardisation and voluntary agreements. As a discourse, Ecological 
Modernization stands optimistic in the sense that environmental protection stands as a 
win-win situation, in which economic growth and environmental protection go hand in 
hand. No trade-off, no tough choices need to be made. In regards to the relationship 
between North and South, the discourse is completely silent about what might be the 
appropriate development path for Third World societies, and it does not comment on its 
own “eurocentric” basis. It is fair to say that the discourse has established itself as the 
hegemonic discourse in Western Europe.  
(Dryzek 1997) (Murphy 2000) 
 
This discourse is employed by a number of stakeholders, but in different ways and with 
different purposes. Most prominently, it is used by the Danish national authorities to 
underwrite and stabilize the assumptions for decision-making and to defend government 
actions in the specific case, but it is also used by Greenpeace Denmark as a “pragmatic 
strategy” to influence the process, as well as by the Danish political opposition.  
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The Danish Landscape  
 
As will become clear below, the Ecological Modernization discourse is dominant in a 
number of Danish stakeholders’ stories about the ‘Kong Frederik IX’, but most 
prominently it is the dominant discourse, on which the story of the national authorities 
rests. Let us see how that is, and what it means for the development of the case:  
  
Change of Story 
The Danish Ministry of the Environment’s (DME) story about ‘Kong Frederik IX’ has 
changed significantly in the process. Initially, the case was presented as a matter of 
compliance or non-compliance with the existing waste regulation. The early press 
releases were concerned with the question, whether the seller or buyer had acted 
illegally, and the Ministry reassured the public and the political opposition that this was 
being investigated. When it was clear that the ferry had arrived at Alang, the Danish 
Environmental Protection Agency (DEPA) reported the case to the National 
Commission of the Danish Police (DEPA 2005). So, at first the story was whether 
someone had violated the existing regulation. The regulation in itself was not the focus 
of attention. This “first” story left no room for questioning the DME’s role, instead it 
had a stabilizing effect for the government, in the sense that focus was on the 
commercial actors’ role and actions. 
 
It soon became clear, though, that the case could be presented differently. Both the 
Danish seller KFIX A/S, Greenpeace, and the Danish political opposition managed to 
present counterstories in the media debate. They were questioning whether the existing 
regulation was adequate in the first place, which would be the DME’s responsibility. 
The DME’s exclusive focus on a possible law violation was challenged, and as it turned 
out the DME was forced to change their story. From being a case about illegal trade 
with an end-of-life vessel, it now changed status to a case, which illustrated the need for 
binding regulation of ship breaking: “…The Danish Environmental Protection Agency 
is of the opinion that international regulation in this field is insufficient” (Politiken 17/3 
2005 – own translation). Since this lack of adequate regulation could be used to criticize 
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the authorities for not having fulfilled their responsibility, the DME instantly included a 
“solution oriented” aspect in their story: the Minister for the Environment would now 
use the case to argue that Denmark, via the EU, had to work for the development of 
such regulation: ”The case of M/F ”Kong Frederik IX” and the degree of international 
attention that this case has obtained, should be used to form an alliance of countries 
willing to engage in improving international rules. Therefore I intend to address my 
Nordic colleagues and the EU ministers of the environment.” (www.mim.dk 1 – own 
translation). It is notable how explanations for the lack of rules are completely absent, 
and how the Minister instead ends up being portrayed as a progressive pioneer who will 
lead her European colleagues in the right direction.  
 
So, the DME story has changed from focus on the concrete case to a story about the 
Minister’s future work for internationally binding regulation. This “second” DME story 
is helpful in canalizing attention away from the DME’s responsibility. By focusing on 
future actions the argumentation dismisses the critics and shows that the DME is in fact 
taking their “regulative” responsibility seriously.  
 
The fact that the critics succeeded in putting pressure on the authorities (who as a result 
changed their story) and in this way affected the DME conduct (while the development 
of binding rules had been initiated in the IMO, it is arguable that the concrete case made 
the Minister act remarkably fast) shows that policy making procedures can be 
significantly affected by non-state actors. Cases like ‘Kong Frederik IX’ can be used to 
catch the public attention and in this way work as a catalyst for influence.  
 
The Ministry’s Long-term Approach 
One of the features that show how the story of the authorities draws on Ecological 
Modernization, are the long-term and holistic elements in their argumentation. The 
Ecological Modernization discourse is characterised by long-term political commitment 
and by holistic analysis of economic and environmental processes rather than piecemeal 
focus on particular environmental abuses (Dryzek 1997:143), and these characteristics 
can be identified in the government position on ‘Kong Frederik IX’:  
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First of all the Minister attempts to make her critics look irresponsible or self-seeking in their 
case-specific approach: “…we are dealing with a case for media and politicians that want to 
heighten their profile on single issue policies” (www.mim.dk 2 – own translation). She states 
that the long-term approach (not the specific case) is what is important: ”while the 
government is working hard for what really matters – better and binding rules – the 
opposition just tries to squeeze the case to the last drop...”  (Ibid – own translation). Later in 
the process (autumn 2005), she goes even further. At an open meeting in November in the 
Parliament’s Commission on Environment and Planning, the Minister assesses that taking any 
further action in the specific case – both bilaterally, and via the Basel Convention’s 
compliance committee – would damage the positive process that has now been started in the 
IMO (Minister's Parliamentary Consultation 2/11 2005). It follows from this logic that further 
action in the concrete case (as the critics suggest) is a really bad idea – who wants to 
jeopardize international negotiations?!   
Despite the authorities’ attempt to dismiss the demand for further action in the ‘Kong 
Frederik IX’ case, the prominent critics on the Danish scene – Greenpeace and the 
political opposition – have insisted that the DME could and should act on the specific 
case. As a consequence of the persistent demand for action and the rather intensive 
media coverage of ‘Kong Frederik IX’, the Minister has been forced to act. As 
described in chapter 4, the authorities have actually taken bilateral action beyond what 
is normally done in situations like this (Lone Schou, interview 10/10 2005) (Minister’s 
Parliamentary Consultation 2/11 2005).  
When commenting on this bilateral action, the Minister has emphasized the fact that India is a 
sovereign state, and that Denmark therefore cannot interfere with national Indian 
environmental regulation. International action through the Basel Convention’s compliance 
committee has been explicitly rejected by her: in a press release the Minister stated that the 
committee - or the COP meetings for that matter - could not be used to interfere in any current 
case. (www.mim.dk 2) (www.mim.dk 3) In general, the Minister has continuously emphasized 
that the authorities’ options for case specific action are very limited. For example on 
September 20th: ”In spite of the many political appeals to the Indian government by the 
Danish government, and in spite of the fact that Denmark has constantly exchanged views 
with India on the “Kong Frederik” and on forward pointing solutions during the negotiations 
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under the Basel Convention, the Kong Frederik will now be scrapped. I see no possibilities of 
any further initiatives in this concrete matter.” (Politiken 20/9 2005a – own translation).  
The long-term element and the focus on future action in the authorities’ story are being 
used to dismiss the specific case as “single issue politics”, thereby removing the 
attention from the DME’s regulative responsibility. It could be interpreted as a 
“stabilizing” element, which ends up drawing a picture in which the DME stands 
flawless. Even though the Minister (as a consequence of other stakeholders’ persistent 
criticism and the continuous media attention) has been forced to take bilateral action in 
the concrete case, her rhetoric strategy seems successful. As will be discussed later, she 
seems to have “won over” most of the prominent critics, who at several occasions stress 
their full support of her work in EU and IMO (Steen Gade, interview 2/9 2005) (Jacob 
Hartmann, interview 10/8 2005) (Minister’s Parliamentary Consultation 2/11 2005). It 
seems that the Minister of the Environment has won this rhetoric battle. 
 
The Ministry’s Holistic Approach 
The DME’s story about ‘Kong Frederik IX’ follows the logic of Ecological 
Modernization in other ways than by its long-term perspectives. The focus of the 
discourse on holistic analyses of economic and environmental processes rather than 
piecemeal focus on particular environmental abuses (Dryzek 1997:143) is also 
identifiable. Despite the Minister’s explicit commitment to improving working 
conditions and protecting the environment in relation to ship scrapping, these aspects 
cannot be separated from the job creating effect this industry has in India: “We should 
not forget that a ship on the beach represents jobs.” (Politiken 24/4 2005 – own 
translation). 
 
Generally, economically feasible solutions to the environmental problems of ship 
scrapping are important for the DME (Minister’s Parliamentary Consultation 2/11 
2005). The assumption that no tough choices between economic growth and 
environmental protection need to be made, is in this way evident in the approach of the 
authorities. Related to this is the industry’s leading role in the solving of environmental 
problems: 
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There is Money in it for the Business 
“The industry itself cooperates enthusiastically in the design and implementation of 
policy. For the key to ecological modernization is that there is money in it for the 
business.” (Dryzek 1997:142). This basic assumption on which the Ecological 
Modernization discourse rests, can be traced in the government story about ship 
scrapping. The concrete regulative instruments that are mentioned as the future 
solutions to the environmental and occupational safety aspects of ship scrapping 
activities in Asia are certification and standardization (Minister’s Parliamentary 
Consultation 2/11 2005) (Lone Schou, interview 10/10 2005). This type of regulative 
means is typically developed with the industry as a central and active partner, which 
means that the industry’s influence on the content of the regulation is significant. Critics 
stress that there is a tendency to develop “soft” standards and objectives that can easily 
be complied with, and that the enforcement of the regulation is often weak or even non-
existing. But the way this aspect is handled in the story of the Danish authorities is by 
highlighting the advantages of having the industry as a partner (which will be discussed 
in the following section).  
 
It is difficult to find any explicit statements about what exactly would motivate the 
shipping industry to choose a “greener” ship scrapping facility if the price is less 
attractive. According to the authorities, regulation in itself would probably be the 
primary motivating factor, i.e. the “fear” of strict regulation and government control is 
what motivates the industry to cooperate and embrace new standards (Lone Schou, 
interview 10/10 2005). Despite this lack of “explanation” about the nature of the 
industry’s incentives, and despite the fact that there are several objections to the 
authorities’ choice of regulative means that would be natural to express31, this element 
in the DME argumentation stands uncontested in the Danish debate. Even the Danish 
political opposition explicitly mentions the environmental and economical benefits that 
India could gain if it – like for example China – would start a “greening” of their 
industry (Steen Gade, interview 2/9 2005). 
 
                                                
31 This aspect will be discussed later in the report. 
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IMO Instead of Basel 
Following the before-mentioned DME arguments about the significant advantages of 
being in partnership with the commercial stakeholders, the IMO is presented by the 
Danish authorities as the undisputed forum in which future development of regulation 
for ships from cradle to grave is going to take place. It is argued that the enforcement 
instruments of the Basel Convention’s are weak and that the IMO regulation already 
covers transportation of ships for dismantling and therefore is “geared” to deal with 
issues that complicate such regulation, for example the notion of international waters 
and the issue of flag states (Minister’s Parliamentary Consultation 2/11 2005). In the 
DME logic it is not a problem to work for new environmental regulation in a forum like 
the IMO, where flag states’ and the shipping industry’s influence is significant. On the 
contrary, the Minister and her staff present the IMO choice as an extremely 
advantageous one, since all stakeholders with an interest in this matter are represented 
in this forum (contrary to the Basel Convention where many of the important shipping 
states are not signatories), which will ensure development of a more effective regime 
(Lone Schou, interview 10/10 2005) (Minister’s Parliamentary Consultation 2/11 2005).  
 
Again the authorities’ presentation stands uncontested in the Danish debate. Both 
Greenpeace and the Danish political opposition are supportive of the DME initiatives 
and their IMO strategy (Steen Gade, interview 2/9 2005) (Jacob Hartmann, interview 
10/8 2005), which is also described by these stakeholders as probably the most realistic 
and effective way of developing binding regulation.  
 
The Danish Consensus   
It has become obvious that the Danish authorities have been forced to change their story 
and act on the specific case as a consequence of the persistent criticism presented via 
the media, i.e. other actors on the Danish scene have successfully influenced the 
policymaking process by use of the ‘Kong Frederik IX’ case. Despite this fact, the story 
and strategies of the authorities stand remarkably uncontested in the Danish debate, and 
it is tempting to interpret the situation as one in which the government’s narrative is not 
only dominant, but also without any powerful counternarratives. Apparently, 
stakeholders whom one would expect to challenge the government’s story are “won 
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over” and have instead ended up expressing their support of the government’s stand and 
actions (www.sf.dk 1) (Jacob Hartmann, interview 10/8 2005). In “discursive” terms, it 
seems like the most prominent Danish stakeholders’ stories argue by reference to the 
Ecological Modernisation discourse. Most strikingly (since they could be expected to 
take a more critical position in this case), both Greenpeace and the Danish political 
opposition’s narratives draw on elements of this “logic”.  
 
According to Dryzek (1997:140-41), countries in which the Ecological Modernization 
discourse is dominant are characterized by a corporatist policy-making structure, in 
which different kinds of interest groups are actively participating in the development of 
policies, and by a rather consensual relationship between key actors in this structure. 
This might help explain why the Danish scenario – as opposed to the Indian – has been 
strikingly consensual: Both Greenpeace Denmark and the political opposition are 
explicitly supportive of the Minister for the Environment’s work in the EU and the IMO 
for new binding rules, and are generally very solution-oriented and pragmatic in relation 
to the outcome of the case. They both stress their “good relationship” with the DME and 
states that they feel that they have been able to influence the political aftermath of the 
‘Kong Frederik IX’ case (Steen Gade, interview 2/9 2005) (Jacob Hartmann, interview 
10/8 2005). Lone Schou from the DEPA confirms the good relationship and further 
states that it is characteristic of the Danish culture of negotiation that there is a good 
cooperation between the stakeholders, and that the tone of negotiation is generally a 
positive one (Lone Schou, interview 10/10 2005). The Minister herself mentions the 
productive cooperation with both the opposition and the NGOs in the specific case at an 
open meeting in November (Minister’s Parliamentary Consultation 2/11 2005).  
 
What are the consequences of this consensus? Most strikingly, it seems that certain 
arguments and criticism, which would be natural to raise in a debate like the ‘Kong 
Frederik IX’, are not raised by the opposition and Greenpeace. This aspect will be 
discussed in chapter 9.  
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State Sovereignty  
There is one aspect, though, in which the above mentioned consensus is absent, viz. the 
North-South aspect. Whereas both Steen Gade and Greenpeace place the primary 
responsibility for the ship scrapping problems in the North, the DME story “avoids” this 
in two ways. First of all, it draws on the Ecological Modernization discourse, which is 
not explicitly concerned with social justice, still less social justice across the rich and 
poor nations of the world (Dryzek 1997:146). The rhetoric strategy is simply to be silent 
about this aspect. Secondly, in situations where this is not possible, the DME story 
refers to the idea of state sovereignty: India is a sovereign state just like Denmark and 
thereby also holds the overall responsibility for their ship scrapping activities. 
Denmark’s responsibility is limited to making sure that its own regulation – in this case 
the EU regulation and Basel – is not violated. It is therefore not Denmark’s business to 
comment on how environmental regulation is carried out in India. (www.mim.dk 1).  
 
The notion of state sovereignty is used to avoid the explicit linking of the specific 
‘Kong Frederik IX’ case with Denmark’s responsibility for environmental protection 
and working conditions in developing countries. It ends up placing the responsibility for 
‘Kong Frederik IX’ on India, and can therefore be used to reject criticism of the DME’s 
role in this case. It goes without saying that the placing of responsibility is always 
expressed in extremely cautious terms, and always by use of the widely accepted notion 
of state sovereignty.  
 
Playing the sovereignty card is not the only way in which the DME attempts to place 
the responsibility on someone else than the Danish state. When discussing the prospects 
for ship scrapping in general, the authorities highlight the principle of producer 
responsibility32  as the philosophy behind future regulation. According to the DEPA, 
producer responsibility is central in the new IMO negotiations and also in 
BAN/Greenpeace’s suggestion of a ship recycling fund, and is generally a concept that 
suits the policy intention of the current government well (Lone Schou, interview 10/10 
2005).  
                                                
32 Producer responsibility is a system where the manufacturer of goods [in this case the shipping industry] has the 
responsibility of collecting and managing the products when they have become waste (www.tekno.dk)    
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Part 2: Sustainable Development  
 
The Discourse 
According to (Dryzek 1997:123), Sustainable Development does not refer to a specific 
accomplishment or a precise set of structures or measures, rather it is a discourse, and it 
is arguably one of the dominant global discourses of ecological concern. The core story 
line of Sustainable Development starts with the following recognition: The 
developmental aspirations of the peoples of the world cannot be met by all countries 
following the growth path already taken by industrialized countries, for such action 
would over-burden the world’s ecosystems. Yet, economic growth is necessary in order 
to alleviate poverty, which is one of the basic causes of environmental degradation. 
(Ibid:129) The most widely quoted definition of Sustainable Development is 
Brundtland’s, which states that Sustainable Development in essence is:”…a process of 
change in which the exploitation of resources, the direction of investments, the 
orientation of technological development, and institutional change are all in harmony 
and enhance both current and future potential to meet human needs and aspirations” 
(World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987:46). The launching of this 
definition increased the awareness of economic and environmental interdependencies 
and helped bringing the developing world into the international development debate 
with its conceptual linking of environment and development or ecology and growth, 
which had traditionally been viewed as two competing or even antagonistic objectives 
(Hansen 1998:6). 
 
Brundtland’s definition has been widely debated and in spite of many attempts it has 
proved difficult to reach an agreed upon precision of the concept. Dryzek explains this 
by arguing that if Sustainable Development is indeed emerging as a dominant discourse, 
astute actors recognize that the terms of this discourse should be cast in terms 
favourable to them (Dryzek 1997:124). This explains why a very wide range of diverse 
stakeholders each try to develop and dominate the discourse and seek to make their 
contribution the dominant one. This is possibly due to the rather vague formulation of 
Brundtland’s definition and the balance between the ecological, economic and social 
dimension of the concept. As Cole (2000) puts it: “The popularity of Sustainable 
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Development would seem to belie, or is perhaps an indicative of, the vagueness of the 
term.” As this analysis will show, the discourse of Sustainable Development is used 
rather differently by the stakeholders in the ‘Kong Frederik IX’ case. They have 
different opinions about which elements of the concept are the most important, and they 
disagree on which dimensions are prerequisites for the others, illustrating that the 
concept can be stretched far.  
 
It is widespread to distinguish between weak and strong sustainability. The weak 
version does not see an inherent conflict between environmental protection and 
economic growth, and proponents of this understanding (like for instance the Indian 
government) will typically argue that economic growth does not necessarily imply 
environmental degradation. The strong sustainability interpretation on the other hand 
implies the existence of limits to economic growth and argues that continuing the 
current global level economic growth is causing severe environmental damage that can 
not simply be fixed by for example technological innovation. (Cole 2000:52pp) 
 
The discourse of Sustainable Development is motivated by the public good, and 
involves a rhetoric reassurance that we can have it all (economic growth, environmental 
conservation and social justice) - not just for the moment, but in perpetuity (Dryzek 
1997:132). This is probably one of the reasons for its wide appeal.  
 
 
The Indian Landscape 
In the ‘Kong Frederik IX’ a range of Indian stakeholders make use of the Sustainability 
discourse, but they draw on different elements of the discourse and use it for different 
purposes.  
 
The Ministry for Environment and Forests 
The Indian authorities make use of the arguments from the Sustainable Development 
discourse in combination with another discourse, viz. the Promethean discourse (see 
part 3 of this chapter). On a superficial view, it might seem impossible to combine these 
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two seemingly antagonistic discourses33, but the way the authorities make use of 
Sustainable Development explains how this is possible. First of all, the weak version of 
the discourse is employed. This version does not see an inherent conflict between 
economic growth and environmental protection, as argued above. Secondly, the 
authorities focus on a particular element of the discourse, viz. the part that recognizes 
the inequalities of the current political-economical world structure. Generally speaking, 
the Indian authorities - in line with many other developing countries - do not use the 
discourse to oppose the global capitalist system as such, instead it uses it to highlight 
how economic growth is necessary in order to alleviate poverty which is one of the 
basic causes of environmental degradation. To use the terms from the Sustainable 
Development discourse: India stresses its right and need to prioritize economic aspects 
as a means and a precondition to improve social and environmental conditions.  
 
During the ‘Kong Frederik IX’ case the Indian government has on several occasions 
indirectly and in diplomatic terms expressed its discontent with the attention this case 
has had both nationally and internationally, and with the way the Danish government 
has handled the case. In a press release from the Indian Ministry for the Environment 
and Forests (www.sf.dk 2), and in a letter from Mr. A. Raja to the Danish Minister of 
the Environment (Raja 2005) it is stated that India cannot consider the ferry ‘Kong 
Frederik IX’ as waste under the scope of the Basel Convention. In the press release it is 
moreover stressed that the international regulation is unclear and that the national Indian 
regulation is to be followed instead of for example the Basel, IMO or ILO guidelines 
and regulation. The fact that India puts national legislation over international rules 
correlates with the element of Sustainable Development that emphasizes developing 
countries’ right to economic development. India does nowhere explicitly dismiss the 
international regulation as such, but instead questions its applicability in this particular 
field, and uses a rhetorical strategy that constantly attaches weight to the importance of 
job-creating and an (environmentally sound) economic development. For example: on 
the webpage of the Gujarat Maritime Board, the scrapping industry in Alang, where 
‘Kong Frederik IX’ is being scrapped, is described as: “…an industry that is both very 
                                                
33 The mainstream Western understanding of the Sustainability discourse is that it is a relatively radical pro-regulative 
environmental discourse, whereas the Promethean discourse is anti-regulative and seems to pay exclusive attention to 
economic growth.  
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lucrative and at the same time contributing to an ecological balance” 
(www.gmbports.org). The shipping activities in Alang are consistently pictured in 
relation to the general societal significance – in Sustainability terms: it can be necessary 
to prioritize economic development in order to achieve environmental and social goals.  
 
For the Danish authorities as well as for the Indian NGO’s the official Indian attitude 
has been surprising, since India has been participating in various meetings in these 
international organizations and has voted in favor of the different international 
guidelines and regulative frameworks (Minister’s Parliamentary Consultation 2/11 
2005). A concrete example is a specific Basel meeting in November 2004, where also 
India participated and agreed on the fact that a ship can become waste, even if it can still 
sail (Minister’s Parliamentary Consultation 2/11 2005). The policy narratives employed 
by the two states, India and Denmark, are polarized, which also shines through in the 
case specific correspondence. The Danish authorities, who draw heavily on the 
Ecological Modernization discourse, describe India’s attitude towards international 
regulation as defensive (Lone Schou, interview 10/10 2005). And the Indian authorities 
find Denmark’s constant references to the Basel regulation inappropriate in the sense 
that it neglects India’s right to determine by itself how to interpret and act in the ‘Kong 
Frederik IX’ case.  
 
A Lack of Consensus  
The fact that the Indian authorities draw on several discourses, and the fact that they 
have a selective use of two discourses that contain antagonistic elements (this will be 
discussed in more detail in part 3 of this chapter), illustrates that we are dealing with a 
narrative landscape quite different from the consensual Danish landscape, where the 
Ecological Modernization discourse has established itself as the hegemonic discourse. 
‘Kong Frederik IX’ has demonstrated disagreements and opposing views between the 
Indian stakeholders – both within and outside the state system:  
 
The lack of consensus within the state system is well illustrated in the changing 
recommendations and comments from the Supreme Court Monitoring Committee. 
Initially the SCMC stated that the Basel regulation was being clearly violated in the 
 72 
 
‘Kong Frederik IX’ case, and that the ship should be sent back to Denmark. This was 
stated in rather strong terms in a recommendation from the SCMC, using phrases like 
“Its [‘Kong Frederik IX’] arrival is in gross violation of the directives on ship breaking 
[of the Hon. Supreme Court of India]…” and …”Riky [alias ‘Kong Frederik IX’] should 
be mercilessly driven out of India”. Later, after the Ministry for the Environment and 
Forests had expressed opposing views, the SCMC changed its recommendation to the 
opposite, viz. that the ferry could stay and that the dismantling could begin. According 
to both the Danish opposition and the Danish Minister of the Environment, the SCMC 
has now adopted almost the exact same phrases that the Indian Ministry for the 
Environment and Forests uses in a press release, where it presents its version of the 
story (Minister’s Parliamentary Consultation 2/11 2005). This can be confirmed by 
studying the documents in question (www.sf.dk 2) and (Dutta 2005 b). As will be 
discussed later, this changed position could be explained by authoritarian elements in 
the Indian system. 
 
NGO’s 
In the Indian debate about ‘Kong Frederik IX’, the Green Coalition – and particularly 
BAN and Greenpeace India - have been drawing on the discourse of Sustainable 
Development. But they do it in a different way and end up drawing conclusions 
different from those of the authorities. From the evolutionary aspect of the discourse 
they conclude that it cannot be expected that developing countries have the capacity and 
resources to enforce stricter environmental regulation, but that the responsibility instead 
should be placed on the industrialized world – in the present world redistribution is 
necessary. Because of that, the developing countries should use their status as wealthy 
and developed nations to take responsibility for the development in the South, for 
example by making sure that their own environmental problems are not simply exported 
to a country with a less strict environmental regulation. In regards to ship scrapping the 
Green Coalition puts it: …”[We are] campaigning globally for clean ship-recycling, 
demanding the onus of cleaning-up of hazardous waste on board end-of-life vessels lies 
with the ship owner and the exporting country and not the ship-breaker” 
(www.greenpeaceweb.org 4) 
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In the specific case of ‘Kong Frederik IX’, the Green Coalition therefore speaks 
strongly in favour of the Basel Convention and the Ban amendment, which makes it 
illegal to export from the North to the South. They stress how this case illustrates the 
need for the Indian authorities to participate in international negotiations with a clear 
mandate for the decontamination of ships of all hazardous substances prior to export 
(www.greenpeace.org 2). This is indeed a different “conclusion” from the one reached 
by the Indian authorities, who make use of the Sustainability discourse to stress their 
right to prioritize national regulation over international. This disagreement goes well in 
line with conceptions of the Indian NGO scene as a vocal and critical scene: 
“…rejecting or resisting public policy formulations that seem anti-poor“ (Jain 2004:92) 
and “struggling against authoritarian state power […] and creates a discourse of 
politics of  protest through constant vigilance and conceptualization of alternatives. It 
has been responsible for breaking the silence on matters pertaining to democracy, 
freedom, equality, rights, justice, and dignity”(Jain 2004:94). In relation to the methods 
used by members of the Green Coalition, for example Ms. Dutta’s Supreme Court 
proceedings against the Minister for Environment and Forests and others, Jain 
(2004:93) state supports that this kind of action is not unusual on the Indian civil society 
scene, where “…prominent individuals have taken social causes up in the courts, 
especially the Supreme Court for vindication of fundamental rights…”. 
 
In contrast to the Danish landscape, the Indian debate is characterized by vocal NGO 
actors, which presents the ‘Kong Frederik IX’ case completely different from the 
authorities. 
 
Summary 
 
Before proceeding to the third dominant discourse, we will sum up some of the points 
that have been put in the spotlight so far:  
 
Firstly, it has been indicated that the two national stakeholder landscapes are very 
different: the Danish consensual relationship between state authorities and NGOs 
cannot be found on the Indian side. The different approaches of the NGO’s in Denmark 
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and India – one very pragmatic and consensual, the other in explicit opposition to the 
state system - indicates that they have fundamentally different roles in a North and a 
South context. On the international scene NGOs like Greenpeace and BAN supposedly 
make use of both strategies: On the one hand they participate in negotiations in the 
various organizations and present solution-models that are “edible” for the industry, and 
on the other hand they file a provoking non-compliance notification regarding the 
specific ‘Kong Frederik IX’ case to the Basel Secretariat (www.sf.dk 3).  
 
Secondly, the analysis has illustrated the dialectic relationship between discourse and 
stakeholder: the stakeholders do not just use the discourses as instruments to reach their 
goals, the discursive formations also restrict what can be said and done by the 
stakeholders. The Ecological Modernization discourse points for example in the 
direction of certain regulative tools, such as certification and voluntary agreements, 
whereas the Sustainability perspective outlines other appropriate measures, for example 
economic compensation to developing countries (Dryzek 1997:127). Regarding the 
specific case, the different discursive starting points suggest different models to the 
handling of the situation, as will be discussed further in chapter 10.  
 
Finally, the analysis has pointed out how rhetorics are linked to stakeholder interests 
and power relations. In the ‘Kong Frederik IX’ case it is not difficult to see why for 
instance India struggles hard to dismiss the Danish argumentation, since the country has 
one of the biggest ship scrapping industries in Asia and therefore has huge interests at 
stake. It is also in this perspective the fact should be seen, that India might stand out as 
less open towards new initiatives than other up-coming developing countries. At a 
general level, the differences in the Danish and Indian positions should be seen in the 
light of the fact that we are dealing with two very different countries. Compared to 
Denmark, India is a huge country dealing with different problems. Poverty is a major 
issue and leads to other priorities in regards to the societal development. Obviously, it 
affects the country’s environmental priorities as well. The use of the Sustainability 
discourse of the Indian authorities highlights this point. As will become evident in the 
following part, the narrative landscape of the ‘Kong Frederik IX’ case is even more 
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complex than presented so far and makes the Indian authorities employ other discourses 
than the discourse of Sustainable Development.  
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Part 3 The Promethean Discourse 
 
The Discourse 
The discourse named ”Promethean” – in its unarticulated form - can be said to 
underwrite government actions all over the world in their strive for economic growth 
(Dryzek 1997:46). In Greek mythology Prometheus stole fire from Zeus and thereby 
increased the human capacity to manipulate the world for human ends (Ibid:45). In the 
Promethean discourse it is exactly humans – and a natural competition between humans 
– that will provide solutions to what others call environmental problems. Prometheans 
do not recognize environmental limits, since nature is abundant and the source of 
resources infinite, i.e. if a certain resource becomes extinct, humans will find other 
resources to take its place. Central for Prometheans are therefore technological 
innovation and a market-based competitive environment to spur this innovation. 
Government intervention is unwanted since it will disturb the “invisible hand” in the 
market (Ibid:51). As a discourse it is silent about so-called displacement, i.e. a situation 
in which the solving of an environmental problem (for example the export of hazardous 
wastes) in one part of the world leads to environmental degradation in another. 
Displacement over time (a situation in which the solving of an environmental problem 
today will create problems for future generations) is not a problem either, since history 
has shown that technological development and economic growth have found solutions 
to all environmental problems that have previously occurred. (Dryzek 1997) 
 
In the following we will analyse by whom and how the Promethean discourse 
dominates the ‘Kong Frederik IX’ case and its aftermath. It is central in the stories of 
both Indian authorities and in those of some of the non-state actors (the commercial 
stakeholders and the liberalist think tanks).  
 
The Indian Authorities 
India is characterised by its status as a low-income economy (www.worldbank.org) and 
the Indian government has in the most recent 5 year plan underscored the importance of 
seeking economic growth as its first priority (Planning Commission 2002). As argued in 
part 2 the Indian government tends to draw on the Sustainability discourse when 
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justifying their need to prioritize economic development. It is possible, though, to argue 
that it has generally become more legitimate to use the articulated Promethean discourse 
about environmental problems, i.e. to segregate the concepts of economy and 
environment and think of them as separated issues, which is the exact opposite of the 
Sustainability discourse. This change can be detected in the Indian argumentations 
about development and environment as well.  
 
Internationally 
The Promethean aversion to regulation of the free market goes for both international 
agreements and for government intervention at the national level. Regarding the first, in 
recent years India has changed its course and attitude at a number of meetings under the 
Basel Convention. It is a common opinion that India has changed its position from a 
rather progressive supporter of international environmental regulation to a much more 
“anti-regulation” one. Specifically when it comes to ship scrapping, India is described 
as having a defensive attitude towards the Basel rules (Lone Schou, interview 10/10 
2005 ), and at the 2004 November meeting (where it was decided that ships could be 
considered waste under the regulation) it was the only party to the convention who 
spoke out against this decision, even though they eventually accepted it. Likewise India 
surprised other delegates at a working group meeting of the Basel Convention in 
Geneva in July 2005 when publicly stating that it had no intentions of adhering to the 
Basel Convention Guidelines on Environmentally Sound Ship Dismantling 
(www.greenpeaceweb.org 5). 
 
In the specific ‘Kong Frederik IX’ case the Indian authorities not only ignore the Basel 
Convention (claiming that the ferry cannot be classified as waste under the Basel rules), 
they also argue that their national waste legislation is more important than the 
international rules. In the statements of the Indian Minister for Environment and 
Forests, Mr. A. Raja, you will find persistent references to the national legislation on 
hazardous wastes. For example in his letter to his Danish colleague (Raja 2005) and in a 
press release regarding the case of ‘Kong Frederik IX’, where he states that the 
international legislation on the issue is “overlapping” and “lacks consensus” and he is 
quoted to say that: “In India the Hon. Supreme Court has given detailed guidelines for 
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regulating ship breaking in this country” and …“the said activity [of ship scrapping] is 
being regulated strictly in consonance with the instructions of the Hon. Supreme Court” 
(www.sf.dk 2). It is not explicitly stated, but other stakeholders’ references to the Basel 
legislation are from the ministry at several occasions met with references to Indian law 
in a way that indicates that what India is really concerned with is respecting its national 
law. The fact that the government puts national waste laws on the same footing as the 
Basel Convention in the specific ‘Kong Frederik IX’ case could be interpreted as a 
signaling of India’s opposition against international environmental regulation that in 
some way ends up dictating the country’s development path. One could also interpret it 
as a subtle reference to the notion of state sovereignty, but - as with other elements in 
the Indian story about the case and its aftermath - it is difficult to get a clear picture of 
the argumentation.  
 
Nationally 
India’s focus on national laws in the ‘Kong Frederik IX’ case could leave you with the 
impression that its development strategy for the shipping industry is pro-regulative. But 
if for example we take a look at what the Gujarat Maritime Board weights in its draft 
policy for the Gujarat ship scrapping industry, this is clearly not the case. The suggested 
solution is a loosening of the existing regulation: “…[the] draft policy includes 
reduction of 5% customs duty on incoming ships and lifting of ceiling on business 
volume by ship-breaker” (The Indian Express 20/9 2005). This anti-regulative strategy 
can also be detected at a general level in the Indian five year plan: “… past times’ 
control and restrictions have retarded the emergence of an investor-friendly climate in 
the country” , and “…[India] must shed the mind-set of shortages that has given birth to 
this regime of pervasive controls…” (Planning Commission 2002). 
 
The Promethean discourse is used – in much the same way as the Sustainable 
Development discourse - by the Indian authorities to justify their prioritization of 
economic growth at the expense of environmental protection and improvement of 
working conditions, as well as to justify their “anti-Basel” position in the ‘Kong 
Frederik IX’ case. Their selective use of the Sustainability discourse results in a 
situation where the two discourses can be combined and end up serving the same 
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purpose. The advantages and disadvantages of having more than one discourse in play 
will be discussed later in the report.  
 
The Shipping Industry 
The shipping industry’s story about ship scrapping draws almost exclusively on the 
Promethean discourse. The commercial stakeholders have been rather silent about the 
concrete ‘Kong Frederik IX’ case, but taking a look at the Industry Code of Practice on 
Ship Recycling34 it is not hard to imagine how they might present the case. According 
to the Code of Practice, ships are not scrapped, but recycled, in what can be described as 
a natural technological process (www.marisec.org 2). Actually, ship recycling is a 
“green” industry that employs a large workforce (Ibid). The Code of Practice does not 
contest that the ship recycling yards in Asia often leave much to be desired in regards to 
working practices and environmental standards, but the responsibility for these matters 
ultimately lies within the countries in which they are situated (Ibid), and the solution is 
not trade-inhibiting environmental and safety regulation.  
Whereas the Ecological Modernization perspective works with the idea of stakeholder 
management, i.e. some sort of regulation of the rather complex chain of sellers, 
middlemen, brokers, buyers, etc., the Prometheans reject this. The chain is not 
questioned – instead it is stressed that the seller cannot be hold responsible for any 
problematic aspects especially not in other parts of the chain. The seller’s responsibility 
stops the moment he has signed a contract with a middleman (www.marisec.org 2). 
Actually, this is exactly the argument used by the seller Thomas Berg, KFIX A/S, in the 
‘Kong Frederik IX’ case: “My concern was not to remove any uncertainty (as to the 
question, if the ship had actually been sold for scrapping). My concern was to include 
the declaration (on the further operation of the ship), and it was included” (Politiken 
9/5 2005a – own translation). In the interview he rejects any indication that he has some 
degree of responsibility for the destiny of the ferry.  
 
                                                
34 The Code of Practice is developed by the Industry Working Party on Ship Recycling under the auspices of ICS and 
comprises representatives from the Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO), International Association of 
Dry Cargo Shipowners (INTERCARGO), International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO), 
the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation (ITOPF), International 
Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF), Oil Companies’ International Marine Forum (OCIMF) (www.marisec.org 2). 
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At the symposium about ship scrapping, which took its outset in the ‘Kong Frederik IX’ 
case, a representative of the Danish shipping industry states that the situation at for 
example Alang is not acceptable for the Danish shipping industry, that the industry is 
responsible somehow, and that it is a supporter of global regulation on the issue 
(Symposium 30/6 2005). He stresses, though, that the right forum for future regulation 
is the IMO, and that he agrees with the views expressed by CEPOS/Liberty Institute 
about the ‘Kong Frederik IX’ case and ship scrapping more generally. The story of 
these think tanks will be presented below. As will be discussed later in this report, there 
seems to be discrepancies between what is said and what is done when it comes to the 
shipping industry’s support of global rules. It is tempting to interpret the situation as one 
in which the industry – in order to avoid the politically incorrect and unpopular 
statements like “it is the Indian ship scrapping worker’s own problem” – free of charge 
employs a green and socially responsible rhetoric, which does not match their anti-
regulative attitude in the concrete negotiations.  
 
Liberalist Think Tanks 
At the Symposium Mr. Barun Mitra argues that ships like ‘Kong Frederik IX’ cannot be 
considered waste, as long as somebody wants to pay for them. In this way he dismisses 
the Basel regulation, and states that ship scrapping has to be seen in its economic 
context and that the trade elements of the case is what is important (Symposium 30/6 
2005). The so-called economic context is most prominently the job creating effect of the 
industry, which is the solution to an important problem in India, viz. poverty. According 
to Mitra (explicitly supported by the shipping representative) the poverty problem can 
be described as: ...” people’s inability to consume” (Symposium 30/6 2005). In 
Promethean terms: the ship scrapping industry – despite its questionable environmental 
and safety aspects – solves a number of societal problems and will lead to the ultimate 
Promethean response to environmental problems: economic growth that will lead to a 
bright environmental future.  
 
Government Intervention 
In a joint paper issued by the Liberty Institute (IL) and CEPOS, named “Creative 
Destruction: Breaking Ships, Building the Economy, Cleaning the Environment”, the 
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‘Kong Frederik IX’ case is also used as a springboard for a discussion of regulation of 
the ship scrapping industry. The executive summary states that “…this paper argues 
that free market principles will provide the economic growth which will benefit both the 
poor and the environment” (Mitra 2005:1). In the paper it is discussed how earlier 
attempts by the Indian government to regulate the domestic shipping industry – 
specifically the decision to demand the so-called gas-free certificates – has had severe 
negative effects on the industry’s competitiveness. It is also discussed, how the Basel 
regulation on ship scrapping (particularly the Ban) can be characterized as “…a 
unilateral non-tariff trade barrier, and potentially fall foul of the WTO rules as well…” 
(Ibid:6). In general environmental and working conditions regulation are seen as a 
complete disregard of free market principles (Ibid:11). Dryzek puts it: “Prometheans 
believe that human beings left to their own devices will automatically generate solutions 
to problems – and that the operation of an invisible hand will guarantee good collective 
consequences at the macro-level of individual-level decisions” (Dryzek 1997:57). Mr. 
Mitra’s analysis of previous government intervention towards the ship scrapping 
industry and of the international environmental regulation that targets this industry is 
indeed Promethean: he labels this regulation as counter-productive and proclaims 
instead that the free market mechanisms will generate solutions to what others call 
environmental problems.  
 
North-South Aspects 
In part 1 and 2 we discussed how the Danish and Indian stakeholders deal with the 
North-South aspect of the ‘Kong Frederik IX’ case. Whereas the NGOs (both on the 
Indian and Danish side) place a significant part of the responsibility for the ship 
scrapping problems on the richer countries in the North, the Danish authorities try to 
“hush up” this aspect or discretely dismiss it with reference to the notion of state 
sovereignty, and the Indian authorities are mostly busy trying to dismiss their own 
responsibility. The Promethean perspective does not show any significant consideration 
for the disadvantageous situation of developing countries. The solution to poverty 
problems like lack of access to clean water and good sanitation (or in this case the poor 
working conditions at Alang or the longer-term environmental impacts of the scrapping 
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activities) lies with the individual people in these countries, and the obvious solution for 
them is to become rich (Dryzek 1997:52).  
 
The dismissal of the disadvantageous situation of developing countries and the need of 
some sort of positive discrimination is identifiable in the Industry Code of Practice, as 
discussed earlier. In the Promethean logic such discrimination would be interfering with 
the free market mechanism. The CEPOS and Liberty Institute share this perspective, but 
it is interesting to see how Mr. Mitra makes use of arguments about Western neo-
colonialism (www.gmwatch.org). This term is typically in use by actors who oppose the 
global capitalist system as such, but Mr. Mitra employs it in a way that gives it the same 
meaning as Western protectionism and thereby avoids any clash with his Promethean 
logic: the explanation why the North takes an interest in environmental regulation in the 
South can be related to an unarticulated OECD fear that industries in the South will gain 
a competitive advantage, due to perceived lenient environmental regulation in the 
South. According to Mitra, this fear is due to the fact that the OECD countries might 
want “a piece of the cake” when a large number of single hull tankers from the EU will 
be scrapped in the near future. (Symposium 30/6 2005).  
 
Technology 
What makes the Liberty Institute/CEPOS and the shipping industries’ version of the 
story Promethean is moreover their focus on technology. Their focus differs from how 
Ecological Modernization – which also has great faith in the potential of technological 
innovation – understands this element. Whereas the Danish authorities’ understanding 
of the future role of technology implies some sort of regulative management of the 
process (for example the government’s explicit support of the initiative of the ICOEPH 
as a way of “frog leaping” towards better working conditions), the technology element 
in the Liberty Institute/CEPOS narrative is linked to arguments about discriminatory 
trade practises (Mitra 2005:7) (one should not disturb the free market mechanisms), and 
again to arguments about Western protectionism. In the Liberty Institute/CEPOS 
narrative ship scrapping in countries like India is an important source of the 
development of technologies. The Basel Ban will reduce these countries’ ability to 
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develop appropriate technologies and thereby lead to a loss of the technology gains 
associated with this industry (Ibid).  
 
 
The International Maritime Organization 
Not surprisingly, the IMO narrative about ship scrapping is rather similar to the 
shipping industry’s narrative outlined above. IMO state members typically have some 
sort of commercial/industrial interest in maritime matters, and the group of so-called 
flag states is known to have strong financial interests and great influence in this forum 
(www.aspships.com). In the IMO Guidelines on Ship Recycling you will find many 
phrases completely identical with the Industry Code of Practice, and generally they 
place the responsibility for ship recycling activities within the developing countries in 
which they are situated, just like the industry opposes the Basel Ban, in which the 
responsibility is placed on the exporting country. In the Industry’s Code of Practice ship 
scrapping is described as a natural technological process, whereas the IMO guidelines 
describe it as a natural commercial process, but both stakeholders see an important 
solution in the transfer of technologies (www.marisec.org 2) (www.imo.org 2) – which 
can be said to be typical for the Promethean understanding of global environmental 
problems (Dryzek 1997:45-61).  
 
Summary 
In part 3 we have discussed how the commercial stakeholders and their vocal 
supporters, the liberalist think tanks, are arguing predominantly with reference to the 
Promethean discourse. Even though it has been argued that there is an increased 
acceptance of explicitly expressing this view, i.e. separating the economy and the 
environment, within the last decade, one still has to consider one’s words! Free trade 
arguments are therefore always followed by statements of support of global rules and 
the acceptance of some – undefined – responsibility. The fact that the IMO rhetoric is 
dominated by this perspective is hardly surprising bearing in mind the influential role of 
the industry in this forum. Neither is the Indian authorities’ use of this discourse 
surprising, taking into account the significance the ship scrapping industry represents in 
relation to the general national economic development.  
 84 
 
Chapter Discussion 
 
Before looking into what types of counternarratives you can find in the ‘Kong Frederik 
IX’ case, let us take a look at what aspects the analysis has pointed at so far.  
 
From part 1 the overriding question is: what are the consequences of the Danish 
consensus? The debate surrounding the ‘Kong Frederik IX’ case has indicated that the 
consensual and corporatist relationship between government authorities, the political 
opposition, and Greenpeace means that significant critical points are not raised in the 
debate. Generally, the opposition and Greenpeace seem to “nurse” their good 
relationship with the authorities and their influential situation to such a degree that one 
starts looking for other actors on the Danish scene to take on the role of government 
watchdog for example a citizen like Mogens Nørgaard Olesen. At present, all 
mentioning of the Basel Ban and the prevention of export of waste from OECD to non-
OECD countries are absent in the Danish debate, even though obviously this possibility 
will not be dealt with in future IMO negotiations. In chapter 12 we will discuss this 
aspect in further detail.  
 
One of the major differences between the Promethean discourse and the Sustainable 
Development discourse is that while the Promethean can be said to rely on human 
spontaneity and ingenuity, Sustainable Development requires coordinated collective 
efforts to achieve goals (Dryzek 1997:125). Also Sustainable Development treats the 
natural environment and its resources and systems much more delicately and as 
something that can be used more or less wisely, imposing more or less environmental 
stress as opposed to the brute matter which is all Prometheans see in nature (Dryzek 
1997:129). It is therefore natural to ask how in the ‘Kong Frederik IX’ case, it is 
possible for the Indian authorities to draw inter-changeably on these rather contradicting 
discourses. In parts 2 and 3 of this chapter we have attempted to outline how this is 
done, even though it is difficult to get a clear picture of which narratives they draw on 
and when35. The analysis illustrates how the Sustainable Development discourse is 
                                                
35 For a discussion of whether this could have been remedied by doing more thorough empirical studies on the Indian 
context see chapter 11. 
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“negotiable” and how far it can be stretched – in ways that might be surprising for the 
conventional Western understanding of the discourse.  
 
As mentioned earlier, the Promethean discourse seems to become a more legitimate 
discourse to draw on when discussing environmental issues internationally. One 
explanation could be that the discourse - in its unarticulated form – has been 
underwriting government actions all over the world for a long time, as Dryzek states 
above. The tendency moreover goes well in line with the increasing trans-
nationalization of capitalism, i.e. the increasingly important role of international 
economic regimes like the WTO. Governments all over the world are committed to 
market liberalization and economic growth as their first imperatives (Dryzek 1997:136). 
This runs counter to the otherwise (at least on paper) generally accepted idea of 
Sustainable Development in its various forms. The economic regimes are highly 
institutionalized and represent massive structural forces that are very difficult for other, 
more environmentally concerned, discourses to fight against.  
 
This chapter has shown how the stakeholders in the ‘Kong Frederik IX’ case draw on 
three “pre-existing” environmental discourses in their stories about the case and its 
political aftermath. The many antagonistic elements of these dominant discourses help 
explain the very different – sometimes completely opposite – versions of the case and 
the regulative landscape that surrounds it. But it is also sobering to see, how some 
stakeholders draw on the same discourses in completely different ways and for different 
purposes. This adds to the complexity of the narrative landscape. The picture we have 
drawn is not complete though, because a number of counternarratives are also 
identifiable in the ‘Kong Frederik IX’ case. 
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Chapter 9: Counternarratives 
 
The narrative landscape of chapter 8 showed how the decision makers in the ‘Kong 
Frederik IX’ case and its aftermath make use of a number of established policy 
narratives to underwrite their standpoints and actions in this complex regulative field. 
The analysis highlighted how for example the story of the Danish authorities about the 
case is a “complete” story with a beginning, middle, and an end, in the sense that the 
logic and argumentation of the well-established Ecological Modernization discourse 
provides a coherent explanation of all aspects of the case and a clear picture of future 
action. In contrast to this, the story of the Indian authorities about ‘Kong Frederik IX’ 
appears less coherent, containing several contradicting elements, and nowhere do they 
express their basic or overall interpretation of the case.36 Many of the other stakeholders 
do this, for example Mr. Steen Gade: “this is a case about globalization with fair rules” 
(Steen Gade, interview 2/9 2005), or Ms. Connie Hedegaard: “this is a case that 
illustrates the need for internationally binding rules” (Minister’s Parliamentary 
Consultation 2/11 2005). This difference becomes important when looking at the two 
national landscapes of counternarratives and critique.  
 
According to Roe (1994:5), the most effective way of undermining an influential policy 
narrative is not by trying to subvert it empirically (that only adds to the uncertainty and 
complexity in areas like this), but instead to challenge it with a convincing 
counternarrative, i.e. an alternative. The critique that has been heard in the ‘Kong 
Frederik IX’ case illustrates this point: the critical voices that have offered a “complete” 
alternative seem to have been the most successful in terms of influencing the cause of 
events. Let us take a look at the landscape of counternarratives: 
 
Lack of Danish Critique 
 
As indicated in the previous chapter, one of the consequences of the so-called Danish 
consensus is the lack of critical voices in the Danish debate. In discursive terms one 
                                                
36 It should be mentioned here that we have not had the opportunity to interview the Indian authorities and ask them 
directly what their overall interpretation of the case is. We interviewed Steen Gade in September 2005 and the DEPA in 
October 2005.  
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could characterise the situation as one in which the discourse of Ecological 
Modernization has established itself as the hegemonic environmental discourse, thus 
outlining what can be said and done in cases like this. Due to its dominant status it has 
been successful in dismissing several critical voices, which has resulted in a complete 
absence of convincing counternarratives:  
 
From the very beginning, one of the most persistent critics of the authorities, Mr. 
Mogens Nørgaard Olesen, has provided different stakeholders and the media with 
information that has shown how both Danish and international law have been violated. 
Through the entire process he has maintained his initial story, viz. that the ferry is a 
national cultural symbol, and that it should therefore return to Denmark (Mogens 
Nørgaard Olesen, interview 30/9 2005). In the beginning of the process two other 
prominent Danish critics, Greenpeace and Mr. Steen Gade, worked closely with Mr. 
Olesen, but at a time when his story was successfully dismissed by the authorities, they 
quickly parted ways with him and pursued a different strategy. To put it differently: Mr. 
Olesen continued to emphasize the law violation and insinuations of nepotism in the 
authorities’ handling of the case, and in this way he “clashed” with the story of the 
authorities in a way that made him stand out as a nationalist without regard for aspects 
like for example the job-creating effect of the scrapping activities in India. In Roe’s 
terminology: his critique focussed on subverting the empirical facts of the ‘Kong 
Frederik IX’ case and it did not constitute a complete alternative to the story of the 
authorities. Greenpeace and Mr. Steen Gade both admit that Mr. Olesen’s effort has 
been extremely valuable, but that they had to part ways with him, since his so-called 
“national romantic” position would be counter-productive for their strategies for 
influence (Jacob Hartmann, interview 10/8 2005) (Steen Gade, interview 2/9 2005).  
 
A powerful stakeholder is of course the Danish shipping industry, which one would 
expect to oppose at least certain elements of the story of the authorities about ‘Kong 
Frederik IX’ and its political aftermath. The fact that the Danish industry has limited 
interests at stake (compared to the shipping industry in countries like Norway or Japan), 
because the Danish fleet is relatively young and the fact that the IMO negotiations are 
still at a very initial stage, probably explain their relative silence. So far the story of the 
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authorities and the industry have managed to run parallel without clashing, but it is 
arguable that the moment the negotiations enter a stage where concrete legislation and 
regulative tools are on the agenda, this might change.  
 
As mentioned several times earlier, the Danish critique from both Greenpeace and the 
political opposition has been limited to emphasizing the authorities’ responsibility to put 
pressure on India. It seems obvious that the “corporatist” element in the Danish model 
(i.e. interest groups are participating closely in the policy making) might create a 
situation in which non-state stakeholders feel that they are able to affect the policy 
making procedures in this way and that they are therefore less prone to criticise 
government actions. It is for example notable that Greenpeace has toned down the Basel 
Ban aspect of the ship scrapping issue (which could be a potential candidate for a 
convincing counternarrative) and instead openly supported the government’s action in 
the EU and the IMO.  
 
The ICOEPH initiative to improve the working conditions at the scrapping yards in 
Alang is a counterstory in the sense that it challenges the authorities’ argument that says 
that nothing more can be done in the concrete case. They furthermore address an 
important aspect that many “environmentalist” critics do not, viz. the importance of 
keeping the Indian ship scrapping jobs. Since it does not challenge the basic 
argumentation of the Ecological Modernization discourse, it is arguable that the 
initiative is compatible with the story of the Danish government in a way that 
disqualifies it as a story that runs counter to the dominant policy narratives of the 
controversy (Roe 1994:155). 
 
As with other aspects of Roe’s “recipe” there is no guarantee that you will find any 
narratives that contradict the dominant ones. It is characteristic of the decision-making 
processes that are suited for a Narrative Policy Analysis that they are complex and not 
easily understood. Often you will find a mesh of circular argumentations that cannot be 
“distilled” into complete narratives, and stakeholders might be confused and unable to 
take in and estimate the complex issue themselves. The hegemonic status of Ecological 
Modernization in the Danish context leaves little room for influential counterstories, a 
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situation quite different from the Indian context, as will be discussed in the following 
section. 
 
The Indian Critics 
 
The Green Coalition has been a vocal critic of the position of the Indian government in 
the ‘Kong Frederik IX’ case. Most importantly, the authorities’ preferring national law 
to the country’s international commitments has been challenged by both Greenpeace 
India and Ms. Dutta from the Corporate Accountability Desk. Ultimately, Ms. Dutta’s 
court case - accusing (amongst others) the Indian Minister for Environment and Forests 
for violation of both national and international law as well as of a previous Supreme 
Court order - put action behind their words. As mentioned in the beginning of this 
chapter, the less coherent story of the Indian authorities leaves room for vocal criticism, 
since it is easy to point out contradicting elements in their press releases and letters. One 
example of this is the changing recommendations from the SCMC as discussed in 
chapter 8. Another example is how Mr. A. Raja, Indian Minister for Environment and 
Forests, in his letter to his Danish colleague assures her that India takes its obligations 
under the convention seriously (Raja 2005). He argues though, that “We have 
determined that the ship cannot be classified as “Wastes” within the scope of Act 2.1 of 
the Basel Convention”37, while later in the same letter stating that: “I would like to 
assure you that India has adequate capacity to ensure environmentally sound disposal 
of the said ship”. The two statements are in contradiction to each other since Mr. A. 
Raja in the second quote states that the ship is to be disposed of, which then makes it 
subject to the article 2.1 of the Basel Convention, which he also refers to. Furthermore 
the Green Coalition argues against Mr. A. Raja’s insurance of an environmentally sound 
disposal of the ship saying that… “It is widely recognised that the beaches of Alang DO 
NOT represent Environmentally Sound Management (ESM) of wastes as defined in the 
Convention”38(www.greenpeace.org 4). 
 
                                                
37 Article 2.1 of the Basel Convention defines waste as ”substances or objects which are disposed of or are intended to 
be disposed of or are required to be disposed of by the provisions of national law” (Basel Convention text). 
38 The Basel Convention defines ESM broadly as: ”Taking all practicable steps to ensure that hazardous wastes or other 
wastes are managed in a manner which will protect human health and the environment against the adverse effects which 
may result from such wastes ” (www.greenpeace.org 4). 
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The Green Coalition’s story about the case and its aftermath draws on the Sustainable 
Development discourse – the strong version, i.e. environmental and social aspects 
should be given a central place in the development plans of the country. In connection 
with the case of ‘Kong Frederik IX’ they accuse the industry of not taking responsibility 
for the trade in end-of-life vessels containing hazardous waste, saying that “…they 
continuously scuttled initiatives geared to have them take ownership of the problem, 
which results in dumping on countries like India and impacts the lives of poor workers 
and the environment” (www.greenpeace.org 2). They furthermore claim that: “The lack 
of action by the Indian Government abets this injustice, and the shipbreakers and 
shipowners who make substantial economic gains jointly sacrifice the interests of the 
most affected” (www.greenpeace.org 2). The story of the Green Coalition has certain 
limitations though, as it misses to come up with convincing explanations about how the 
prioritization of environmental and social aspects should be done exactly. In other 
words, it never really moves beyond its critical starting point and reaches the status of a 
”full” story.  
 
Recalling the fact that the Danish authorities were forced to change their story as a 
result of persistent criticism in the media debate, it is notable that the Indian authorities 
have not gone through a lot of trouble to respond to the critique. At one point they felt 
obliged to release a press statement that dismissed the Green Coalition’s accusations of 
law violation, but it is not possible to detect any significant change of story. Since the 
letters and bilateral action of the Danish authorities have had no visible effect on the 
Indian position either, it indicates that we are dealing with a political system that is less 
responsive to criticism than for example the Danish system. Together with the before 
mentioned allegations about corruption, this raises questions about the condition of the 
Indian democracy and about whether we are dealing with a political structure in which 
the state is under pressure from economic interests (the ship scrapping industry 
primarily) in a way that significantly affects their actions in the ‘Kong Frederik IX’ 
case.  
 
 91 
 
 
International Counternarratives 
 
We realize that the ‘Kong Frederik IX’ case only touches upon the complex 
international scenario that surrounds ship scrapping, and that it is not possible to 
document any case-related counternarratives at the global level, i.e. stories that run 
counter to the narratives of the international institutions. But if we move beyond the 
concrete case and examine the ship scrapping scenario in general, it is possible to detect 
counternarratives that challenge the dominant narratives of for example the IMO.  
 
Greenpeace has in recent IMO negotiations launched the idea of a ship recycling fund, 
which introduces an economic mechanism to promote clean and safe ship scrapping. 
Basically the idea is that ship scrapping should be seen as a service to the shipping 
industry, and that the industry should pay a minor fraction (0,5%) of their total turnover 
to finance an environmentally sound recycling of a ship. A comprehensive report 
elaborated by the reputable consultant company ECORYS, outlines in detail how such a 
fund could be organized and managed, as well as the rationale behind the idea. So far, 
the idea of a ship recycling fund has had a favourable reception in the IMO, but several 
stakeholders (for example the DEPA) estimate that once the negotiation process enters a 
more concrete stage, the commercial stakeholders will oppose it strongly or at least try 
affect the process in way that makes implementation of such a fund complicated. In that 
case the IMO attempts would not offer an alternative to the present floating regulative 
situation.  
 
The ship recycling fund represents a counterstory to the IMO conception of scrapping 
(see chapter 8, part 3), since it outlines the scrapping activities as a service to be paid for 
by the industry. The fact that it has not yet been dismissed by the opponents could be 
explained by its status as a “full” story instead of fragmented critique, which makes it 
difficult for opponents to simply dismiss it. Furthermore, it does not contest that ship 
scrapping need to be a profitable activity for the involved commercial stakeholders, 
which is a cornerstone in the IMO story. In other words: even though it challenges 
certain elements in the dominant narrative, the counternarrative speaks the same 
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language as the dominant one. Most importantly its apparent success should be seen in 
light of the fact that the negotiation process is still at an initial stage.  
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Chapter 10: The Metanarrative 
 
The idea behind the metanarrative is described by Roe as: 
 
“Once you had mapped this network of interrelated cause-and-effect statements, you 
could see if there was a pathway that took one from problem definition to proposed 
solution and that no one interviewee had hit upon alone, but which became visible and 
useful only when the views of all interviewees were considered together” (Roe 1994:x) 
 
This quote contains at least two important words: proposed solution. Roe’s approach is 
distinctively solution-oriented – the researcher’s role is to help decision makers and 
their critics to make sense of the complex policy issues that they are dealing with. And 
the metanarrative is supposed to find a set of common assumptions that make it possible 
for opponents to act on an issue over which they still disagree (Roe 1994:156). While 
the conclusion in chapter 11 will pin out the identified obstacles to the development of 
binding rules for ship scrapping (answering the research question), this chapter will – in 
line with Roe - attempt to present the identified features of chapters 8 and 9 in a way 
that makes the ‘Kong Frederik IX’ case and its aftermath more amenable for both 
decision makers, their critics, and further research.  
 
Roe defines the metanarrative as ”…the candidate for a new policy narrative that 
underwrites and stabilizes the assumptions for decision making on an issue whose 
current policy narratives are so conflicting as to paralyze decision making” (Roe 
1994:4). He states that there is no guarantee that a metanarrative exists: some are 
created, others are pre-existing, some have to be discovered, and others just aren’t there 
(Ibid:6). In this case, the narrative analysis of chapters 8 and 9 have revealed how the 
use of a number of “pre-existing” policy narratives about the environment can be 
identified, and how they help explain the polarization and uncertainty that surrounds the 
‘Kong Frederik IX’ case and the new regulative field of ship scrapping.  
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What are we regulating? 
 
The analysis of policy narratives in the ‘Kong Frederik IX’ case and its political 
aftermath shows most strikingly that the stakeholders have completely different 
perceptions of the “regulative target”. Some regard end-of-life vessels as waste, others 
as a resource. Even in situations when this dispute is not the focus of attention, there are 
immense differences in the way the stakeholders describe the trade with end-of-life 
vessels and the ship scrapping activities in Asia. These differences matter, since the 
opposing perceptions of the regulative field have profound implications for what is 
considered necessary regulation, - and which forum the development of rules should 
take place in.  
 
At this initial stage of the IMO negotiations the “definition dispute” has been toned 
down and the current process is being described in positive and promising terms. The 
narrative policy analysis has shown though that the different perceptions of the 
regulative target are linked to sometimes opposing and antagonistic perceptions of the 
basic relationship between environment and economy. It has equally shown that the 
prospects for finding common ground in cases like ‘Kong Frederik IX’ are therefore 
more complicated than some stakeholders prefer to describe it. How can common 
ground be found, for example, between “Promethean” stakeholders, who do not 
recognize environmental limits, and those “Sustainability” stakeholders, who believe 
that India should prioritize social and environmental aspects of the development of the 
scrapping industry?  
 
A new perspective on this polarized dispute would be a recognition of the “paradoxical” 
nature of ship scrapping. As with many other waste issues, one has to recognize that 
what some consider waste is a resource to others. An internationally accepted definition 
of ship scrapping therefore has to encompass both these aspects – in order to make it 
possible for both Northern and Southern, commercial and non-commercial, state and 
non-state stakeholders to accept it. The establishment of the joint working group 
between IMO, ILO and Basel is a first step towards developing a common language 
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(and thereby definitions) of ship scrapping. It is arguable that in reality the powerful 
stakeholders are unwilling to accept such an encompassing definition, but it is not 
within the scope of this analysis to assess this. Instead the purpose here is – by use of 
Roe’s approach – to point out some of the contested and agreed-upon issues within this 
field and present them in a way that is more amenable to further research and decision-
making. The analysis has so far pointed out that unless a more clear and agreed-upon 
definition of the regulative field is found, the future IMO negotiations will face severe 
obstacles: in order to find out how to regulate, you have to know what to regulate. 
 
How should we regulate? 
 
The implications of the employment of different policy narratives in the attempt to 
stabilize the assumptions for decision making become distinct, when we turn to the 
discussion of what concrete regulative measures the new rules should contain. It is 
characteristic for the narrative landscape surrounding the ‘Kong Frederik IX’ and its 
political aftermath that the stakeholders are quite silent about what concrete regulative 
measures they see as the solution to the current ship scrapping problems. International 
standardisation and volunteer agreements with the industry seems to be the preferred 
tool on the Danish side, but nowhere are the possible complications39 in regards to 
implementing and enforcing such tools in an Indian context mentioned. 
 
Apart from the liberalist think tanks (and in some regards the shipping industry), all 
stakeholders seem to generally support the idea of internationally binding 
environmental regulation to a certain degree. When looking at this trend in a narrative 
perspective, you could say that neither the Ecological Modernization discourse nor the 
Sustainability discourse leaves much room for “anti-regulation” arguments, which 
explains some of the stakeholders’ apparently pro-regulative attitude. The Promethean 
stakeholders basically oppose environmental regulation, since it goes against the logic 
of this discourse, but the analysis has shown that in the current debate their rhetoric 
strategy is to focus on certain types of regulative measures that they support – for 
                                                
39 Potential complications and caveats of such regulative measures will be discussed in Chapter 12 
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example the establishment of voluntary agreements. In this way they can keep a green 
image and seem forthcoming and keen to protect the environment.  
 
So far, some stakeholders have mentioned measures like standardisation, certification, 
and voluntary agreements as the future measures to be implemented in this field. These 
measures will be discussed in further detail in chapter 12. What is of importance here is 
the IMO considerations about a so-called ship recycling fund, but the contents and 
outcome of the idea is far from clear due to the initial stage of the negotiatons. What is 
clear so far is that the different ideas about regulative measures that have been presented 
(though in little detail) from some of the stakeholders all focus on measures that place 
the responsibility for the handling of end-of –life vessels on the importing countries in 
which they are scrapped, and as the situation is at present these are countries of the 
South.  
 
The Timeframe 
 
The above discussion about concrete regulative measures leads us to the timeframe for 
the development of rules. The narrative analysis has revealed an interesting aspect of the 
current debate and negotiations, viz. that the timeframe for developing a new regulative 
system in regards to ship scrapping is hardly brought up by any stakeholders. ‘The 
‘Kong Frederik IX’’ case illustrates that if the decision making process is slow, ships 
will be scrapped while the stakeholders negotiate. The negotiation process that has now 
started in the IMO has a long time perspective, in the sense that a concrete regulative 
framework is officially anticipated in 2008 or 200940 (IMO 2005). The relative slow 
negotiation process is a general characteristic of the establishment of international 
environmental regimes and is therefore not questioned by the stakeholders. The paradox 
with ship scrapping is that a large number of single-hull tankers and ships containing 
hazardous components will be phased out and scrapped now and within the next couple 
of years. Once the IMO regulation is completed, the ships that will require scrapping 
might be less “hazardous”, since the ships that are built today generally contain less 
                                                
40 Several stakeholders have indicated though, that this is an unrealistic goal and that the process is likely to take much 
longer. 
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hazardous materials and therefore are easier to dismantle in an environmentally friendly 
way and with less health hazards for the workers.  
 
A new perspective on this aspect of the narrative landscape could be that stakeholders, 
who see this aspect as a problem, could try to bring it into the IMO negotiations. 
Perhaps there is a need for differentiating between short-term and long-term regulation 
in this field? At least the analysis of chapters 8 and 9 has made it obvious that this quite 
problematic aspect is absent in the current story about the IMO process.  
 
Basel versus IMO 
 
Finally, the narrative analysis has cemented the clash between international 
environmental regulation and the global trade regime. ‘In the ‘Kong Frederik IX’’ case 
the stakeholders are polarized on the issue of whether the ferry should be classified as 
hazardous waste and therefore regulated by the Basel Convention, or if the case really is 
about trade with recyclable steel and therefore falls under the WTO regulation. In most 
stakeholders’ narratives it has been possible to detect a tendency towards dismissing the 
legitimacy of the Basel Convention. It is described as a weak regime with no 
enforcement power and therefore useless in the specific case, or even worse it is 
described as representing interests of developed countries and serving as a disguised 
protectionist trade mechanism. If we turn our eyes from the specific case to the political 
aftermath, the trend towards seeing the IMO as a future forum for ship scrapping 
negotiations adds to the dismissal of the Basel Convention.  
 
Since many of the stakeholders are supporters of international environmental 
conventions, they attempt to tone down their Basel critical arguments. Their stories 
about ship scrapping are presented in a way that does not challenge the inherent 
contradiction between the trade elements in the Basel regulation and the WTO 
principles about free trade with all products. The ‘Kong Frederik IX’ case and the field 
of ship scrapping more generally have the potential to challenge the current co-existence 
of international environmental and international trade regimes. As will be touched upon 
in chapter 12 of this report it is arguable that powerful stakeholders on the international 
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scene have an interest in not spurring a trial case about this aspect, and the analysis of 
chapters 8 and 9 supports this argument. Instead the analysis shows a trend towards 
choosing a more industry-oriented forum (the IMO) to develop environmental 
regulation.  
 
The Usefulness of the Metanarrative 
 
In the process of identifying the different policy narratives that are at play in the ‘Kong 
Frederik IX’ case, no “pathway that took one from problem definition to proposed solution” 
has appeared. But the metanarrative above has outlined certain issues that are of potential use 
for both decision makers and their critics. These issues include the need for a common and 
encompassing definition of the regulative target (end-of-life vessels), the implications of 
different models of regulation (for example the economical burden of implementing more safe 
and environmentally sound ship scrapping procedures), the need for differentiating between 
short-term and long-term regulation, and finally the critical consequences of choosing the 
IMO over Basel as the future regulative forum. In the process of collecting empirical data on 
the ‘Kong Frederik IX’ case we have been left with the impression that both decision-makers 
and their critics have been confused and unaware of many of the implications of their position 
in the specific case. Hopefully, our analysis will be of use to these actors.   
 
The usefulness of the metanarrative can also be expressed in terms of further research. In line 
with our use of Roe’s methodology as a heuristic device, all of the issues outlined above 
could – with advantage – be examined further. Especially the last issue, viz. the implications 
of the IMO as the regulative framework, should be given attention since this report has 
pointed out a more “complicated” picture than many of the stakeholders. The analysis has 
shown that some sort of clarity about the competences and the legitimacy of this institution 
needs to be developed, and so does the relationship of the IMO regulation with other types of 
regulation (for example the Basel Convention), if some of the pitfalls outlined in the 
metanarrative above are to be avoided. The polarized stakeholder landscape and the 
uncertainty that surrounds the regulative target will most likely impede the negotiations 
significantly, if the mandate of this institution is not clear.  
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Chapter 11: Conclusions 
 
What does the ‘Kong Frederik IX’ case tell us about potential obstacles in the upcoming 
process of developing internationally binding regulation for ship scrapping? 
 
The conclusion will answer the research question by summing up the possible obstacles 
that have been identified throughout the report. 
 
First of all the report documents that the regulative situation surrounding the ship 
scrapping scenario can be characterized as a floating regulative situation open for 
interpretation since it is ambiguously covered by several sets of regulations at various 
levels. Most prominently it falls under both environmental agreements as the Basel 
Convention and a trade regime like the WTO. This leads to an unclear situation, of 
which stakeholders may take advantage since the numerous stakeholders at play have 
different political agendas and sometimes conflicting economical interests, and 
therefore interpret the present rules in very different ways. The floating situation 
underlines in itself the need for clarifying the current situation and for agreeing upon 
international binding regulation of ship scrapping. It represents in itself a potential 
obstacle for the development of internationally binding regulation of ship scrapping. 
 
Secondly, the case illustrates that the shipping industry is a powerful industry protected 
by legal features like International Waters and Flag States. These legal features and the 
advantages they represent for the involved flag states and the industry are also a 
potential obstacle for the development of future regulation in the field, since it is 
doubtful that the involved stakeholders will be willing to give up these privileges in a 
negotiation of new legislation. Furthermore, the shipping industry is a border-crossing 
industry with, at least so far, little incentive to obtaining a “green image”. This 
complicates a possible future implementation of regulative means that are based on this 
assumption - as is the case for the majority of the tools mentioned by the stakeholders in 
relation to the case ‘Kong Frederik IX’.  
 
 100 
 
Thirdly, the report has pointed at the fact that ship scrapping involves a large number of 
diverse stakeholders with huge and varied economic and political interests at stake. This 
stakeholder variety and the inherent conflicts of interests lead to basic disagreements on 
the regulative target as described in chapter 10. A related, and crucial, obstacle to the 
development of new rules is the lack of a widely accepted definition of what is being 
regulated. Moreover, the time perspective is generally ignored by the stakeholders, 
when talking about the development of new regulation. In the period of time it will take 
to develop new regulation, a very large number of ships containing hazardous materials 
will be scrapped, and when the regulation is fully developed there will probably not be 
an urgent need for the regulation anymore. As with the definition dispute mentioned 
above this aspect is linked to the choice of regulative tools and represents an obstacle to 
the development of rules.  
 
Finally, the case has pointed at the issue of responsibility as a potential obstacle for the 
development of new rules. The majority of the stakeholders are silent about this aspect, 
which is of great importance and related to decisions about what regulative tools are the 
most appropriate and where to place the financial burden of implementing these tools.  
The identified tendency goes towards placing the responsibility on the importing 
countries in the South and not the exporting nations in the North. 
 
 
Reflections on Validity 
 
Having concluded on the research question, it is time to reflect on our choice of theory 
and methodology.  
 
Time 
On the face of it Emery Roe’s Narrative Policy Analysis seems easy to approach: 
through four analytical steps you will most likely be able to present a more amenable 
version of a complex regulative field. But a closer look at his methodology reveals that 
it is in fact an extremely thorough approach, which requires time, resources, and 
analytical experience of the researcher. The ideal procedure consists of at least eight 
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phases, in which several qualitative interviews with all key stakeholders are conducted, 
network analysis of all the different problem statements expressed during the interviews 
are made by use of computer programmes, the analysis is “tested” by several 
researchers, etc. (Roe 1994: Appendix A) 
 
At the outset of our report, it was clear that we would not be able to perform such an 
ideal procedure, but other elements in Roe’s approach seemed appropriate for our 
empirical field and our research agenda, so we decided to go ahead and make use of his 
analytical perspective. Here at the end of the report it has become clear though, that our 
“selective” use of Roe’s approach has had consequences for the outcome of the analysis. 
It is a very time-demanding task to get a sophisticated and differentiated picture of all 
the different policy narratives that characterise a field like ship scrapping. At times, all 
that we have had to work with were the stakeholders’ brief statements in press releases 
or news articles, and it would no doubt have been helpful to base the narrative analysis 
on in-depth interviews to a larger degree. Our “incomplete” use of Roe’s methodology 
has therefore had implications for the outcome of the report and can be seen as a 
limitation in regards achieving a fully-documented picture of the narrative landscape, 
which indicates the potential danger of making wrong conclusions. 
 
A Roe Try-out 
Let us start by saying that the Narrative Policy Analysis approach has successfully made 
it possible for us to answer our research question. It has functioned as a heuristic device 
in a complex field, and has given us a number of analytical tools that have enabled us to 
work exploratively and differentiated - open towards all kinds of 
aspects/factors/problems/solutions that might characterize the situation. Keeping in 
mind the limitations outlined above, we do feel that Roe’s approach has produced a new 
perspective on the ship scrapping field, which potentially could make it more amenable 
for both the involved stakeholders and for further research.  
 
In retrospective one should see our use of Roe in this report as a “try-out”. We have 
tried to apply his theory and methodology to the ship scrapping field and see how far it 
could get us. It has been educational in the sense that it has showed the problems related 
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to a selective use of his methodology. One of his basic rules, namely “never stray too 
far from the data if you want to be useful” (Roe 1994:xii), has also been challenging in 
our case study approach, since the ‘Kong Frederik IX’ case constantly has opened up 
for new areas and discussions, which could be tempting to pursue.  
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Chapter 12: In Perspective 
 
In this last chapter we will discuss certain aspects of the linkages between globalisation, 
development, and environment - more specifically the linkages that tell us something 
about the current trends in regulation of global environmental problems. Special 
emphasis is on the issues that have been guiding and motivating our research: the role 
and influence of state versus non-state actors; and the clash between environmental 
regimes and trade regimes, bearing the North-South perspective in mind. 
 
Globalisation, Development, and the Environment 
 
Globalisation has made the environmental debate inseparable from the development 
debate, partly due to the border crossing nature of many environmental issues, and 
partly due to the linking of environment and development in concepts like Sustainable 
Development. Actors hold different positions in the discussion of the impacts of 
globalisation on both development processes and environment issues, but the 
stakeholder scenario can roughly speaking be boiled down to two opposing camps: a) 
those who see economic globalisation and free trade as a prerequisite for environmental 
regulation; and b) those who consider this development to be the main culprit of 
environmental problems. Will globalisation aggravate the environmental and 
developmental problems of today, or will it - on the contrary - facilitate solutions to 
these problems? Some label the former group “globalisation protagonists” and the latter 
“globalisation sceptics” (Hansen 1998:1). There are, naturally, many variations in 
between these two polarized camps as the analysis of this report illustrates.  
 
The basic disagreement can also be identified when looking at the stakeholder landscape 
of international environmental regulation - even though rhetorically the majority of 
these stakeholders agree that regulation is necessary. As this report shows, stakeholders 
disagree, not only about the target of regulation, but also about the choice of regulative 
tools and about which forum the decisions should be made in. In the following we will 
discuss a number of regulative trends that are generally characteristic of targeting global 
environment problems today. These trends are also identifiable in the specific ‘Kong 
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Frederik IX’ case, where huge interests are at stake, and where it is a difficult task for 
the involved stakeholders at various levels to agree on how regulation is best developed. 
The case analysis supports the argument that trade in scrap materials from ships is a 
large and diverse economic activity compared to for example trade in CFCs or the issue 
of endangered species. It raises the question of whether hazardous waste can be 
effectively enumerated in a one-size-fits-all international agreement as may other 
regulative subjects like the regulation of ozone-depleting materials or regulation of 
endangered species. (Examples from Ferrentino 1997:69).  
 
At the heart of the current conflicts in the process of developing regulation on 
international trade in hazardous waste - including regulation of ship scrapping - are 
issues of inequity (North-South issues), since wealthy nations seek to find ways of 
dealing with their problems, which may ultimately mean imposing them on the poorer 
developing countries. This trade can be said to underline the problems of unequal 
development in terms of North-South conflicts (Sloep 1996:184). In this report the 
“inequity” discussion has been underlining most of the ‘Kong Frederik IX’ case, most 
explicitly in the stakeholders’ refusal to accept responsibility in the specific case, and in 
their different conceptions about which regulative framework is best suited for the 
purpose.  
 
Regulative Trends 
 
Our report has described current attempts (for example the Basel Convention) to 
regulate and control trade and movements of hazardous waste in the form of end-of-life 
vessels. Furthermore, new tendencies in regulating this particular issue (for example 
under the IMO framework) have been discussed. According to Birnie (2002), such 
attempts [to regulate trade and movements of hazardous waste] typically have certain 
features in common, viz. that they combine:…an increasingly strong preference for 
elimination or disposal at source […] wherever possible, with, in other cases, a regime 
of regulation, monitoring, prior environmental impact assessment, or prior consent 
designed to minimize the risks of disposal and provide for the protection of other states 
and the environment of  common spaces (Birnie 2002:302). He furthermore sees a trend 
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towards growing support for a precautionary approach in international environmental 
law, but states that it is premature to treat the precautionary principle as a rule of 
international law or to draw any firm conclusions regarding its contents (Birnie 
2002:438). These observations from Birnie (2002) chime well in with the idea of 
international agreements like the Basel Convention, but other regulative trends have 
entered the international policy making arena as the regulative landscape and its actors 
are changing. We will now discuss main characteristics of these trends, some of which 
have been drawn into the debate about ‘Kong Frederik IX’, for example certification, 
increased producer responsibility, and voluntary agreements.  
 
Certification and Self-regulation 
Certification and self-regulation have gained the attention of policy makers worldwide 
in recent years, and various studies point at the trend of using these regulative measures 
in developing environmental policies, with the industry as a partner. Self-regulation41 is 
often preferred by the industry and according to Gunningham (1998:50) self-regulation 
is likely to play a more important role in the future, either as an alternative or as a 
supplement to direct government regulation. Self regulation is often practised through a 
set of codes of conduct developed by the industry, the sector itself, or the individual 
company. 
 
In relation to ship scrapping, at first glance, self-regulation and certification systems 
might not be obvious choices, since the ship scrapping industry in Asia can be 
characterised as consisting of small and rather unorganized enterprises that – at least so 
far - have had no incentives to green their image. If the industry was dominated by a 
large company with a green image to consider, it could be a more obvious choice. But if 
the new binding IMO rules and the many single-hull tankers to be scrapped in the near 
future leads to a larger demand for environmentally sound ship scrapping facilities (as 
some stakeholders in the ‘Kong Frederik IX’ case has pointed out), this type of 
regulation could become relevant. Especially the idea of an internationally agreed upon 
certification system has been mentioned by some stakeholders in the aftermath of the 
‘Kong Frederik IX’ case (for example by the Danish political opposition) as a possible 
                                                
41 It is not yet a precise concept, but it may be defined as a process whereby an organized group regulates the behavior 
of its members. (Gunningham 1998:50) 
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way towards safer and greener ship scrapping. Such a certification system should both 
encompass environmental and workers’ health and safety concerns, and the argument is 
that the certification system should be developed internationally, thus making it possible 
for e.g. OECD countries to send ships like ‘Kong Frederik IX’ to a certified Indian ship 
scrapping yard. In the case of ship scrapping a certification system could be developed 
in corporation with e.g. MARISEC, or the IMO, or national shipping industry 
associations.  
 
At a general level there are several critical voices to the certification argument. Utting 
(2000:15) stresses that environmental certification (for example ISO 14000) evaluates 
environmental management, not environmental impacts. He also points to the fact that 
the degree of autonomy of those monitoring, the rigor of their methods, and the 
substance of their benchmarks or goals cannot be taken for granted and have to be 
scrutinized periodically - or as he puts it: “…it may be necessary to occasionally verify 
the verifiers ” (Ibid). It is also relevant to consider certification in a North-South 
perspective, because even though it is mentioned that the certification system related to 
ship scrapping should be developed internationally, it would inevitably be influenced by 
the industries of the North. The leading role of this industry is evident in the way 
industry influences international bodies such as ISO (Utting 2000:23). At an even more 
general level one can refer to how business has increasingly been influential in for 
example putting various UN institutions under pressure. We will return to this aspect 
when discussing the role of the IMO in relation to regulation of ship scrapping.  
 
According to a UNRISD42 study assessing self-regulation initiatives internationally, 
there is a danger of such systems and codes being seen as more than they really are, and 
that they are used to deflect criticism and reduce the demand for external regulation. 
The study sees it as:”…important to develop strategies to ensure that codes are 
complementary to government legislation and provide space for workers to organize.” 
(Jenkins 2001:29)  
 
                                                
42 United Nations Research Institute for Research and Social Development 
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As indicated above the new regulative trends of certification, self-regulation, and other 
mainly volunteary initiatives in international environmental regulation may be 
problematic in a North-South perspective. It should be considered whether the benefits 
that might be derived from such initiatives will be able to overshadow the caveats and 
problems related to it, since some of the considerable downsides might be for the 
countries in the South (Utting 2000:30). For example: voluntary initiatives have mainly 
been developed and designed in the richer industrialised countries and by Northern 
actors and thus under certain institutional conditions - conditions that might not be 
present in all developing countries.  
 
In relation to the choice of the arguably industry-influenced IMO as the central 
multilateral organisation to regulate ship scrapping internationally, it should be noted 
that at this initial stage in the negotiation process, the preferred regulative tools are a 
ship recycling fund (not the Greenpeace version, that is!), certification systems, and 
agreements with the industry in line with the trends described above, which is very far 
from the Basel Ban’s direct ban on export of hazardous wastes from OECD to non- 
OECD countries. As outlined in the report, the vast majority of stakeholders now accept 
the IMO as the best suited forum for developing internationally binding regulation in 
ship scrapping, and the prospects of this will be discussed in the following. 
 
The Role and Influence of State versus Non-State Actors 
 
The trends described above towards an extended corporation between state and non-
state actors in developing environmental regulation leads us to a general discussion of 
the potential influence of non-state actors (NGOs and commercial stakeholders) in a 
field traditionally dominated by state actors. This is a part of what Gunningham and 
Sinclair call a reshaping of the regulatory landscape, where a number of environmental 
stakeholders to some extent have departed from their traditional roles. Some 
commercial stakeholders have apparently become “proactive”, arguing that business is 
part of the solution rather than merely the problem and have sought to develop a variety 
of volunteer initiatives (as described above). Environmental NGOs have to some extent 
redirected their attention towards cooperation through strategies ranking from 
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confrontations to partnerships. And government policy makers noting the above and 
seeing the potential for industry’s self-management, have become increasingly 
enamoured with the possibilities of ‘steering, not rowing’ in policy design. 
(Gunningham 2002: 190) 
  
In the case of ‘Kong Frederik IX’, a range of NGOs have played an influential role 
through the media, especially in regard to continuously drawing attention to the case, 
thus putting pressure on the powerful state actors. Furthermore, certain NGO’s have 
played a noteworthy role in the political aftermath that has followed the case. This 
applies to for example Greenpeace in Denmark. In India the Green Coalition has played 
a progressive role, for example by bringing the case before the Indian Supreme Court in 
an attempt to hold the official authorities responsible for their actions. This report 
illustrates that the influence of such non-state actors on the international environmental 
policy making is significant, but in spite of this noteworthy non-state actor influence, 
the study also indicates that the state actors are still extremely influential in international 
environmental regulation – especially in floating situations like ship scrapping. They are 
inevitably in charge of negotiations and responsible for their implementation and 
enforcement, even if they acknowledge the increasing role of non-state actors. The 
analysis furthermore points at the shipping industry as a stakeholder, which potentially 
will have great impact on future regulation of the issue - in line with the general 
regulative trend of increased involvement of commercial actors in the development of 
environmental regulation.  
 
This report documents, that the recently initiated ship scrapping negotiations are 
moving away from what was the intention of the Basel Ban, viz. a total ban on trade in 
hazardous waste from OECD countries to non-OECD countries, agreed upon under an 
international convention signed by a range of state signatories. Instead the latest 
development points towards a new legally binding regulative tool, which is bound to be 
less restrictive than the Basel Ban. At this initial stage the negotiations and discussions 
in the relevant committees in the IMO do not even include such a ban as a possibility. 
Those in favour of this development point at the fact that the IMO already regulates all 
other parts of a vessel’s operating life and that it is therefore natural to also have this 
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last part of the life-cycle under its legislation. The new regulative framework under the 
IMO will have the industry as a central negotiation partner, since the state delegations 
often include representatives from the shipping industry. Some argue that since the IMO 
counts among its members the relevant shipping nations, including flag states and the 
major shipping nations, it is more likely that the regulation will be respected. Critiques 
argue though, that the shipping industry is so influential in the IMO that it will prove 
difficult to develop anything but a vague regulation that suits the industry and does not 
take sufficiently into account the human and environmental impacts of ship scrapping.  
 
Clash between Environmental and Trade Regimes 
 
As stated in the beginning of this chapter there are basic disagreements as to how 
economic trade related issues are connected with environmental and developmental 
issues. These different points of view are essential in understanding the discrepancy 
between environmental end trade regimes that often create disputes and constitutes a 
classical dilemma. As governments all over the world are increasingly committed to 
market liberalization and economic growth as their first priority, it is not surprising that 
trade regimes often hold precedence over environmental regimes in practice. Even 
though there has not yet been a case under the dispute settlement body of the WTO 
about the relationship between the WTO rules and an environmental convention, the 
unclear relationship constantly leads to diverse interpretations and has impacts on for 
example how a convention like the Basel Convention can be enforced. One study 
concludes that environmental regulation does not appear to interfere significantly with 
either trade or investment, whereas trade practices and policy have significant impacts 
on environmental quality and regulation (Buckley 1993:143).  
 
In our view, the ‘Kong Frederik IX’ case illustrates an unfortunate tendency, viz. the 
weakening of the Basel Convention. Up until now, the Convention has been seen as a 
rather successful international agreement, and at the time of writing only one single 
signature is missing in the ratification of the Basel Ban. Ship scrapping represented a 
challenge for the Basel Convention, but it seems to have failed the test. The IMO has 
been selected as the future regulative forum, and the pioneer status of the Ban has been 
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dismissed, which is a step back in the fight for solving global environmental problems 
in a way that places the responsibility for these problems on the ones that create them.  
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